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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT 
Docket No. 890143-CA 
I. 
SPECIFIC RULE CONFERRING JURISDICTION 
ON THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DECIDE THIS APPEAL. 
The case that is before this Court on appeal was 
heard in Fourth Circuit Court, American Fork Department, in 
and for Utah County, State of Utah, on or about the 28th day 
of February, 1989. The Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, 
Rules 1 and 3(a), confer jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals 
to decide the Appeal of the final decision rendered in the 
Fourth Circuit Court, American Fork Department, in and for 
Utah County, State of Utah. 
II. 
CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE APPEAL. 
This appeal is from a final judgment rendered by a 
jury in the Fourth Circuit Court, American Fork Department, 
in and for Utah County, State of Utah, where defendant/ 
appellant JOSEPH E. NOVOSEL was found guilty of driving under 
1 
the influence of alcohol. 
III. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the road block in question violated the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 14, of the Utah Constitution as an unjust-
ified stop, search and seizure of defendant/appellant 
NOVOSEL. 
2. Whether the requiring of defendant/appellant 
NOVOSEL to perform field sobriety tests based solely on a 
mild odor of alcohol and reddened eyes violated the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 14, of the Utah Constitution. 
3. Whether the arrest of defendant/appellant 
NOVOSEL for a DUI following his performance of the field 
tests was unjustified and violated the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14, of 
the Utah Constitution. 
4. Whether the refusal of the trial court to 
preempt certain veniremen for cause based upon their bias and 
prejudice against drinking alcohol was prejudicial error. 
5. Whether the refusal of the trial court to 
preempt certain veniremen based upon their familiarity with 
the prosecuting attorney, the arresting officer, and with 
other veniremen was prejudicial error. 
6. Whether the trial court's refusal to read 
2 
certain jury instructions concerning probable cause for a 
stop was prejudicial error. 
7. Whether the trial court's denial of defendant's 
Motion for Dismissal at the close of the State's case was 
proper. 
8. Whether the trial court's denial of defendant's 
objections and motion to strike Officer Beeder's statement 
concerning a field test, which had been suppressed prior to 
trial, was prejudicial error. 
9. Whether the evidence derived at time of trial 
was sufficient to support a verdict of guilty. 
IV. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, AND RULES. 
The Constitutional provisions and statutes that 
this appeal is based on are: The Fourth, Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; 
Article I, Section 12 and Article I, Section 14, of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah; and Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, U.C.A. 77-35-18, Rule 18 (2)(e): (4) and (14). 
V. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
HISTORY 
On or about August 1, 1987, defendant/appellant 
JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL was stopped at a roadblock located at SR-68 
at 6800 North, Lehi, Utah. (Exhibit "A", T.R. p. 53, In. 1, 
3 
2, 14-23.) Subsequent to his being stopped at the above 
mentioned roadblock, JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL was arrested and 
charged with DUI. (See Exhibit "A".) 
On or about November 14, 1987, appellant's Motion 
to Suppress Evidence or in the Alternative to Dismiss 
(attached hereto as Exhibit "B") was heard in the Utah County 
Justice Court, Precinct No. 1, Pleasant Grove, State of Utah, 
where the Justice of the Peace denied appellant's motion. 
On or about April 1, 1988, a jury trial was held in 
the Utah County Justice Court, Precinct No. 1, Pleasant 
Grove, State of Utah, where a finding of guilty was entered 
in the above said court. 
Within thirty (30) days following appellant's 
conviction in the Utah County Justice Court, Precinct No. 1, 
Pleasant Grove, State of Utah, appellant filed his request 
for a de novo trial. 
On or about May 26, 1988, appellant's Motion to 
Suppress Evidence or in the Alternative to Dismiss was heard 
in the Fourth Circuit Court, American Fork Department, in and 
for Utah County, State of Utah. On or about July 6, 1988, 
Circuit Court Judge John Backlund denied appellant's Motion 
to Suppress or in the Alternative to Dismiss finding that the 
roadblock in that case was not an unreasonable stop and 
seizure of the defendant. 
On or about February 10, 1989, appellant filed a 
second Motion to Suppress Evidence or in the Alternative to 
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Dismiss. (Attached hereto as Exhibit "C".) On or about 
February 28, 1989, American Fork Circuit Court Judge Backlund 
denied appellant's second motion. 
On or about February 10, 1989, appellant filed a 
Motion in Limine. (Attached hereto as Exhibit "D".) On or 
about February 28, 1989, the Fourth Circuit Court granted 
appellant's motion suppressing the field sobriety test known 
as the Horizontal Gaze-Nystagmus test. 
Appellant made a continuing objection as to all of 
the evidence introduced as a result of the roadblock stop, 
which the trial court overruled. (See Exhibit "A", T.R. p. 
55, In. 1-6.) 
Appellant moved to strike statements by Officer 
Beeder alluding to a field test which had been suppressed at 
the pretrial Motion in Limine. (Exhibit "A"f T.R. p. 109. 
In. 20-24.) 
Appellant moved at the close of the State's case to 
dismiss the charge of DUI against appellant on each of the 
two theories proposed by the prosecution. (See Exhibit f,A", 
T.R. p. 139-142.) The trial court denied defendant/ 
appellant's motion to dismiss during the trial. (See Exhibit 
"A", T.R. p. 142.) 
On February 28, 1989, a jury in the Fourth Circuit 
Court, American Fork Department, in and for Utah County, 
State of Utah, found defendant/appellant guilty of DUI and 
the finding was entered in the above-said court. (See 
5 
Exhibit "See Exhibit "A", T.R. p. 201, 202.) 
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on or March 13, 
1989. Appellant seeks a review of the February 28, 1989 
judgment from the Fourth Circuit Court, American Fork 
Department, in and for Utah County, State of Utah, finding 
defendant/appellant guilty, as well as a review of each of 
the prejudicial errors committed by the trial court as stated 
above. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 1, 1987, defendant/appellant JOSEPH A. 
NOVOSEL was returning home from a family outing when he was 
stopped at a temporary roadblock at SR-68, at 6800 North, 
Lehi, Utah. (Exhibit "A", T.R. p. 53, In. 1, 2, 14-23.) 
The officers conducting the roadblock did not observe any 
traffic or equipment violations nor any suspicious activity 
prior to stopping Mr. NOVOSEL. (See Exhibit "A", T.R. p. 60, 
In. 16-21.) 
Arresting Officer Beeder spoke with defendant/ 
appellant and observed that his speech was not slurred, that 
his answers were appropriate, that his responses were prompt, 
and that he was polite and courteous. (See Exhibit "A", T.R. 
p. 98, In. 11-24.) 
The roadblock in question was a temporary roadblock 
as opposed to a permanent roadblock. There were no prior 
notices given of this roadblock. (See Exhibit "E", State of 
Utahrs response to defendant/appellant!s Second Request for 
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Discovery, No. 3.) The purpose of the roadblock was to 
check for licenses, registration and consumption of alcohol. 
(See Exhibit "E", No. 15.) There is no record of the number 
of persons stopped at the roadblock herein. (Exhibit "E", 
Response No. 7.) There is no record of the number of DUI 
arrests made at this roadblock. (Exhibit "E", Response No. 
8.) There is no record of the number of other arrests at 
this roadblock. (Exhibit "E", Response No. 9.) There is no 
record of other citations given at this roadblock. (Exhibit 
"E", Response No. 10.) There is no record of any specific 
directions, guidelines nor instructions given to the police 
officers concerning the law enforcement at the roadblock, 
other than those contained in the two-page document entitled, 
"Utah County Sheriff's Policy on Roadblocks." (See Exhibit 
"F", State of Utah's reply to defendant/appellant's Third 
Request for Discovery, Response No. 1.) Officers at the 
roadblock had considerable discretion in dealing with persons 
stopped at the roadblock and were not instructed on whether 
or not to look through vehicles for evidence, how long to 
detain each vehicle, whether to attempt to smell for alcohol 
or other contraband, what to do if a vehicle made a legal U-
turn before arriving at the roadblock, nor were they given 
any specific directive concerning the questioning of a 
motorist who was stopped at this roadblock. No empirical 
data was available to demonstrate that roadblocks are more 
effective in dealing with the drunk driving problem versus 
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traditional roving patrols. (Exhibits ffE,f and "F" above, 
which are the State of Utahfs reply to defendant/appellant's 
Second and Third Requests for Discovery.) No complaints, 
reports, nor extra patrol requests nor deputies1 personal 
knowledge for the need of a roadblock as concerns alcohol 
violators have been provided. (Exhibits "E" and "F".) 
Defendant/appellant was stopped solely as a result of the 
roadblock. (See Exhibit "A", T.R. p. 60, In. 19-21.) 
Arresting Officer Tracy smelled a mile odor of alcohol and 
observed nothing else before performing the field tests. 
(Exhibit "A", T.R. p. 76, Ln. 10-19.) Based upon the 
arresting officer's observation of a mild odor of alcohol 
(Exhibit "A", T.R. p. 96, ln. 12, 13.), defendant/appellant 
was required to perform field tests. (Exhibit "A", T.R. p. 
99, ln. 10-15.). Defendant/ appellant performed the field 
sobriety tests, including the heel to toe test, which he 
passed (Exhibit "A", T.R. p. 109, ln. 15-21 and p. 119, In. 
5-7); and a hand/slap test, which defendant/appellant 
completed. (Exhibit "A", T.R. p. 101, In. 15-16.) The 
hand/slap test is not taught by the POST Academy and there is 
nothing from POST instructing how to judge a pass or fail of 
this test. (Exhibit "A", T.R. , p. 99, In. 25 and p. 100, 
ln. 5-9.) Defendant/appellant's ability to follow these 
instructions was good and he easily understood instructions 
and verbalized without problems. (Exhibit "A", T.R. p. 101, 
ln. 21-25 and p. 102, ln. 2.) The State's expert, Taylor, 
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stated that NOVOSEL, "could have been under the legal limit 
when driving, and that nobody knows or would know what his 
blood/ alcohol would have been at the time of driving." 
(Exhibit "A", T.R. p. 136, In. 22-25.) Defendant/appellant 
stated he had consumed three beers within a half hour prior 
to driving before he was stopped at the roadblock. (Exhibit 
"A", T.R. p. 168, In. 22-24.) 
VI. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT. 
On or about August 1, 1987, at about 6:24 PM, 
defendant/appellant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL was improperly stopped 
at a police roadblock at SR-68, at 6800 North, Lehi, Utah. 
Such DUI roadblocks set up for the purpose of stopping all 
traffic without any articulable facts giving rise to 
reasonable suspicion for a stop are in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment's United States Constitutional and of 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitutional rights to 
freedom from unlawful search and seizure. The intrusion on 
individual rights from such a stop outweighs any accompanying 
public interest that may be a corollary of such roadblocks. 
Information seized at such roadblocks should be 
suppressed on the grounds that it was unconstitutionally 
seized. Information that is obtained as a result of an 
unconstitutional search and seizure should be suppressed in 
order to discourage police using such unconstitutional 
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t a c t i c s . 
The r i g h t t o an i m p a r t i a l t r i a l by o n e ' s p e e r s i n 
g u a r a n t e e d by t h e S i x t h Amendment of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s 
C o n s t i t u t i o n and by A r t i c l e I , S e c t i o n 1 2 , of t h e Utah 
C o n s t i t u t i o n . I m p l i c i t i n t h a t r i g h t i s t h e r i g h t t o 
o b j e c t i v e h e a r i n g of t h e f a c t s by such a j u r y . In t h i s c a s e , 
t h e j u r y was no t composed of an o b j e c t i v e body. Some of t h e 
v e n i r e m e n w e r e n o t i m p a r t i a l b e c a u s e of t h e i r p r i o r 
a c q u a i n t a n c e w i t h S t a t e A t t o r n e y S h e r r i e Ragan and a r r e s t i n g 
o f f i c e r Beede r . F u r t h e r m o r e , c e r t a i n ven i remen s h o u l d have 
b e e n p r e e m p t e d f o r c a u s e b e c a u s e of t h e i r b i a s and 
p a r t i a l i t y a s e x p r e s s e d by t h e i r moral p r e d i s p o s i t i o n a g a i n s t 
d r i n k i n g a l c o h o l i n a n y c i r c u m s t a n c e s . F u r t h e r m o r e , 
v e n i r e m a n G o t t f r e d s o n s h o u l d have been preempted fo r c a u s e 
b e c a u s e of h i s e x p r e s s e d m o r a l p r e d i s p o s i t i o n a g a i n s t 
d r i n k i n g a l c o h o l unde r any c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 
Also i m p l i c i t i n t h e r i g h t t o a j u r y t r i a l by o n e ' s 
p e e r s i s t o have a t r i a l where t h e f a c t - f i n d e r s a c t i n d e p e n d -
e n t l y . In t h i s c a s e t h a t was no t p o s s i b l e b e c a u s e a t l e a s t 
f o u r (4) of t h e v e n i r e m e n knew e a c h o t h e r and by t h e i r 
a c t i o n s , a t l e a s t one such ven i reman when a sked i f s h e cou ld 
be f a i r l e a n e d ove r t o a sk a n o t h e r ven i reman i f t h e y cou ld be 
f a i r . ( E x h i b i t "A", T.R. p . 34, I n . 18 , 19 . ) Such a c t i o n s 
show s u f f i c i e n t g rounds fo r a l l o w i n g t h e i n v o l v e d ven i remen 
t o b e p r e e m p t e d . I n t h i s c a s e , n o n e of t h e v e n i r e m e n 
m e n t i o n e d a b o v e w e r e p r e e m p t e d f o r c a u s e and t h u s t h e 
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defendant did not receive a fair and impartial hearing. 
Finally, the evidence derived at the time of the 
trial was not sufficient to support a guilty verdict. Taken 
in total, there was not sufficient evidence to confirm in the 
mind of an objective venireman that the defendant was guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt because defendant/appellant had 
appropriate responses, speech and thought, was able to pass 
the heel to toe test and the State ?s expert testified that 
defendant/appellant could have been under the legal limit 
while driving his vehicle. 
VII. 
ARGUMENT, 
A. APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCHES 
AND SEIZURES AS GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 
14, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, WAS BREACHED WHEN HE WAS 
STOPPED BY A DUI ROADBLOCK. 
In the United States it has been established that 
police officers may not randomly stop a vehicle to check 
license and registration without a reasonable suspicion of 
wrongdoing. Such a stop is unconstitutional because it 
leaves too much discretion to the police officers. See
 t 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 468 (1979); 99 S. Ct. 1391. 
There the United States Supreme Court stated: 
Except where there is at least articulable and 
reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed 
or that an automobile is not registered, or that 
either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise 
subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping 
an automobile and detaining the driver in order to 
check his driver's license and the registration of 
11 
the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment. Id. 
The Prouse Court further stated the rule for 
automobile stops. 
Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants 
constitute a "seizure11 within the meaning of the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, even though the 
purpose of the stop is limited and resulting 
detention quite brief. The permissibility of a 
particular law enforcement practice is judged by 
balancing its intrusion of the individual's Fourth 
Amendment interests against its promotion of 
legitimate governmental interests. Id. 
As set out by the Prouse case, the test is one of 
balancing the intrusion into an individual's Fourth 
Amendment's interests against the promotion of legitimate 
governmental interests. As stated earlier, in this case 
there were no articulable legitimate governmental interests, 
because the State has shown no records to support the degree 
to which roadblocks promote governmental interests. (See, 
Statement of the Facts, page 6.) Nonetheless for purposes 
of argument, numerous factors considered by courts in 
applying the balancing test are: The amount of discretion 
the officer at the roadblock maintained; whether prior 
notices of the location and purpose of the roadblock were 
given to motorists to prevent surprise; whether the roadblock 
was a permanent roadblock or a temporary roadblock; the 
purpose of the roadblock; the time of day of the roadblock; 
and whether less intrusive methods were available to 
accomplish the alleged State's interests. Ekstrom v. State 
of Arizona, 663 P. 2d, 992, 994 (Ariz. 1983); 136 Az. 1; 
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State v, Koppel, 499 A. 2nd 977, 978 (N.H. 1985); 127 N.H. 
286; State v. Holley, Second District Court, in and for 
Weber County, State of Utah, Case No. 16530 (See attached 
Exhibit "G,f ; State v. Smith, 674 P. 2d, 562, 565 (Okl. CR 
1984); Delaware v. Prouse, (supra); State v. Marchand, 706 
P. 2d, 225 (Wash. 1985); 104 W. 2d 434; and State v. Olqaard, 
248 N.W. 2d, 392, (S.D. 1976). Each of the above courts held 
that the intrusion of the roadblock was too great and thereby 
held the roadblock unconstitutional. 
Many instances in the cases above have a parallel 
instant in the case at bar. In Ekstrom, the court found in 
that roadblock, "the grave danger that such discretion might 
be abused by the officer in the field, a fact which caused 
the court in United States v. Prouse, (supra) , much concern.11 
Ekstrom at 996. In the case at bar, there is no record of 
any specific directions, guidelines or instructions given to 
each officer concerning the law enforcement at the roadblock 
and the officers had considerable discretion in dealing with 
persons stopped at the roadblock. See, Statement of Facts, 
page 6.) In the case at bar, as in Ekstrom, officers: 
. . . were not told what to do if a vehicle turned 
around to avoid the roadblock. They were not told 
whether to inspect visible cans or bottles. They 
were not told whether to shine a flashlight in each 
vehicle that was stopped after dark. They were not 
told whether to smell inside each vehicle to detect 
the smell of alcohol. Ekstrom at 993. 
Even though vehicles in Ekstrom were detained from 30 to 40 
seconds to five minutes, the court held that the degree of 
13 
intrusion in light of the surprise and fright occasioned on 
the motorists was a significant and substantial intrusion. 
Id, 
In Smith, the court stated: 
The roadblocks in the present case could well act, 
and most likely did act, as a total surprise to 
those passing through. The subjective intrusion, 
for example, fear and apprehension, potentially 
imposed upon the individual innocent of misconduct 
is simply too great. Smith at 564 (supra) 
In Ekstrom, the court found in that roadblock, "the 
grave danger that such discretion might be abused by the 
officer in the field, a fact which caused the court in United 
States v. Prouse, (supra), much concern." Ekstrom at 996. 
The Koppel court found that an unpublicized and temporary 
drunk driving roadblock that was set up in the evening: 
. produces a substantially greater amount of 
"subjective intrusion—a generation of concern or 
even fright on the part of lawful travellers, . . 
. " (Martinez/Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558, 96 S.Ct. at 
3083) than does a permanent roadblock whose 
existence and purpose are common knowledge. Koppel 
at 983. 
In the present case, there was no advertising nor 
prior media notice of the temporary roadblock which was set 
up in the evening hours. 
The purpose of the roadblock in the present case 
was to check for drunk drivers. (See Exhibit "D".) 
In State v. Smith, 674 P. 2d, 562, 564 (Okl. CR 
1984), the court stated that the: 
end justifies the means approach [in an attempt to 
remove DUI offenders from the public highways] 
draw[s] dangerous close to what may be referred to 
14 
as a police state. 
The Smith court held that: 
. the Fourth Amendment protection against an 
unreasonable seizure of the person is violated by 
the use of a temporary roadblock as a means to stop 
all traffic (or traffic at established intervals) 
without any articulable facts giving rise to a 
reasonable suspicion for the stop, for the purpose 
of seeking out criminal DUI offenders. State v. 
Smith, 674 P. 2d, 562, 565 (Okl. CR 1984). 
T
^e Smith court recognized that "a basic tenet of American 
jurisprudence is that government cannot assume criminal 
conduct in effectuating a stop such as the one presented 
herein." Id. 
In S m i t h , as i n the case a t hand, there was "no 
s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y w h i c h w o u l d s u p p o r t , d i r e c t l y or 
i n d i r e c t l y , the S t a t e ' s c o n t e n t i o n that i t has the power to 
e s t a b l i s h checkpo int s to i n s p e c t a l l m o t o r i s t s to d i s c e r n i f 
t h e y a r e i n t o x i c a t e d . " Id, a t 565. A l l of the ev idence 
obta ined at the roadblock in Smith was suppressed . 
The r e a s o n i n g from t h e Smith c o u r t was found 
l o g i c a l and a d o p t e d by t h e Utah Second D i s t r i c t Court of 
Weber County i n S t a t e v . H o l l e y , ( s e e E x h i b i t "G"). In 
H o l l e y , the Utah Second D i s t r i c t Court adopted the reasoning 
i n S m i t h , r u l i n g t h a t t h e r o a d b l o c k i n q u e s t i o n was 
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , d e s p i t e e v i d e n c e t h a t the roadblock in 
q u e s t i o n was p r o f e s s i o n a l l y and s a f e l y condupted. Id . 
15 
B. ALL INFORMATION AND EVIDENCE CONCERNING JOSEPH A. 
NOVOSEL WHICH WAS SEIZED AT THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
ROADBLOCK MENTIONED HEREIN SHOULD BE EXCLUDED UNDER THE 
"EXCLUSIONARY RULE." 
As the court knows the so called exclusionary rule 
is a procedural rule of Federal Consitutional law used to 
deter unlawful police conduct. Under the exclusionary rule, 
evidence of all material seized in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment is inadmissible in a criminal proceeding. This 
rule was made applicable to the states under Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643 (1961); 81 S.Ct. 1684. It has long been held 
that no evidence seized as a result of a Fourth Amendment 
Violation may be admitted at trial. (See Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); 83 S.Ct. 407. The information 
seized at the roadblock in this case should be suppressed 
because it was seized in violation of Mr. NOVOSEL's Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. 
C. JOSEPH A. NOVOSELfS SIXTH AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
TO A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL BEFORE A JURY OF HIS PEERS 
AND HIS RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 12, OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION, WAS BREACHED BECAUSE THE JURY THAT HEARD 
HIS CASE WAS NOT FAIR AND IMPARTIAL. 
It is a well-established point that the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial in criminal prosecutions is 
applicable to states as being "fundamental to the American 
scheme of justice." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 
(1968). In the case at bar, Mr. NOVOSEL was charged with 
driving under the influence of alcohol. A venireman who has 
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a predisposed belief that consumption of alcohol was per se 
immoral cannot be fair and impartial when sitting as a trier 
of fact where the accused is charged with a crime involving 
the drinking of alcohol. 
U. C. A. 77-35-18, Rule 18(e) (14), of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a challenge for 
cause is proper where: 
. a s t a t e of mind ex i s t s on the part of the ju ro r with re fe rence to the cause, or to e i ther 
p a r t y , which w i l l p r e v e n t him from a c t i n g 
i m p a r t i a l l y and w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e t o t h e 
s u b s t a n t i a l r igh t s of the party challenging [the j u r o r ] . 
Utah courts have held that, "impartiality has been defined as 
a mental attitude of appropriate indifference." State v. 
Brooks, Utah, 453 P. 2d 799, 801 (1977). 
In the case at bar, venireman Gottfredson stated 
that he felt it was morally wrong to drink an alcoholic 
beverage or beer. (Exhibit "A", T.R. p. 22, In 19-25 and p. 
23, In 1-9.) Venireman Gottfredson also stated that he has 
counselled a lot of people about drinking alcohol, " . 
because of the problems that it causes in their home." 
(Exhibit "A", T.R. p. 23, In. 7-9.) When asked by the trial 
court if he could be fair and impartial given that belief, he 
stated, "I think so," rather than an unequivocal yes. 
(Exhibit "A", T.R. p. 23, In. 6.) 
The Utah Supreme Court has held: 
A juror who has formed "strong and deep impressions 
which will close the mind against the testimony 
that may be offered in. opposition to them; which 
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will combat that testimony and resist its force" 
should be excused for cause. State v. Hewitt, 
Utah, 689 P. 2d 22, 25 (1984); citing Reynolds v. 
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155, 25 L.Ed. 244 
(1878). 
Venireman Gottfredson should have been removed for 
cause because he could not be impartial in light of his ex-
pressed strong, moral convictions that it was wrong to drink 
alcohol. Clearly Gottfredson's strong moral convictions 
against drinking make him significantly biased and partial 
against defendant/appellant who is charged with driving under 
the influence of alcohol. The defense moved the trial court 
to dismiss Gottfredson for cause, but the trial court denied 
the motion (Exhibit "A", T.R. p. 39, In. 2-8.). The defense 
was forced to use its remaining peremptory challenge to 
remove venireman Gottfredson. 
The Utah court in State v. Bishop, Utah 753 P. 2d 
439, 451 (1988), stated: 
It is prejudicial error to compel a party to 
exercise their peremptory challenge to remove a 
panel member who should have been removed for 
cause. 
The trial court1s refusal to remove Gottfredson from the jury 
panel for cause was, therefore, prejudicial error. 
Venireman Ms. Searle, who stated that she knew 
Sherry Ragan, the prosecutor in the case, while they taught 
at the same elementary school, should also have been removed 
from the jury for cause via her relationship with the 
prosecutor. (Exhibit "A", T.R. p. 8, In. 5-9.) The trial 
court refused to remove Ms. Searle. (Exhibit "A", T.R. p. 
18 
39, In. 16-22.) 
The trial court in refusing to remove venireman 
Shaffer from the jury panel (Exhibit "A", T.R. p. 39, In 9-
11.) committed prejudicial error since Ms. Shaffer by her 
actions demonstrated that she would be unable to give an 
independent opinion of the case as a juror. This was 
evidenced by Ms. Shafferfs response to the question of 
whether she would give in to her honest opinion because of 
her familiarity with another venireman, Ms. Vance, to which 
she responded in action by leaning forward and asking Ms. 
Vance, "We could be fair, couldn't we?" (Exhibit "A", T.R. 
p. 34, In. 18-19. 
The trial court was unduly influenced by judicial 
economy concerning the selection of jurors when it stated in 
response to defendant's challenges for cause, "Well, if I 
strike all those people, we'll be coming for another jury 
trial with a different jury. I just—I mean, it's obvious if 
I do that, we won't have enough, we won't have four people 
left, but—." (Exhibit "A", T.R. p. 35, In. 25, p. 36, In 
1-3.) 
VIII. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the constitutional provisions, statutes, 
facts, arguments and multiple prejudicial errors committed by 
the trial court as stated herein, appellant's constitutional 
rights were violated and a fair trial was not afforded 
19 
appellant. Therefore, appellant respectfully moves this 
Honorable Court to reverse the decision of the trial court 
named herein. 
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of June, 1989. 
MITCHEL ZAGER 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief to counsel for 
plaintiff/respondent Sherrie Ragan, Utah County Prosecutor, 
37 East Center, Suite 200, Provo, Utah 84601, on the 19th day 
of June, 1989. 
MITCHEL ZAGER 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM I 
AMENDMENT IV 
U.S. CONSTITUTION 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
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ADDENDUM II 
AMENDMENT VI 
U.S. CONSTITUTION 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertain by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause 
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel 
for his defence. 
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ADDENDUM III 
AMENDMENT XIV 
U. S. CONSTITUTION 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
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ADDENDUM IV 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 12 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to 
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be 
confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory 
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of 
the county or district in which the offense is alleged to 
have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. 
In no instance shall any accused person, before final judg-
ment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the 
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled 
to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be com-
pelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for 
the same offense. 
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ADDENDUM V 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant 
shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
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ADDENDUM VI 
UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, TITLE 77-35-18 
Rule 18 (2)(e) (4); (14) - Selection of Jury. 
(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either 
peremptory or for cause. A challenge to an individual juror 
may be made only before the jury is sworn to try the action, 
except the court may, for good cause, permit it to be made 
after the juror is sworn but before any of the evidence is 
presented. In challenges for cause the rules relating to 
challenges to be panel and hearings thereon shall apply. All 
challenges for cause shall be taken first by the prosecution 
and then by the defense. 
(e) 
(4) The existence of any social, legal, business, 
fiduciary or other relationship between the prospective juror 
and any party, witness or person alleged to have been 
victimized or injured by the defendant, which relationship 
when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds 
that the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to 
return a verdict which would be free of favoritism. A 
prospective juror shall not be disqualified solely because he 
is indebted to or employed by the state or a political 
subdivision thereof; 
(14) That a state of mind exists on the part of the 
juror with references to the cause, or to either party, which 
will prevent him from acting impartially and without 
26 
prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging; 
but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of 
having formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or 
cause to be submitted to such jury, founded upon public 
rumor, statements in public journals or common notoriety, if 
it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror can and 
will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and 
fairly upon the matter to be submitted to him. 
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anyone from the prosecution? 
Are you Ann 
MS. SLARLL: 
THU COUKT: 
MS. SEARLE: 
THL COURT; 
acquaintanceship? 
MS. SHARLJL.: 
school. 
Til* COURT: 
MS. SiJARLb: 
THE COURT: 
Searle? 
Yes. 
Yes, ma1an. 
I know Sherry Rarrgn. 
And what is the nature of that 
Ue taught at the same elementary 
And how long zro was that, ma'an? 
It's been oh, ten years ago or so. 
And were you—how ^rould you 
characterize your friendship? T-Tere you real close-— 
MS. SLARLL; 
THE COURT: 
teacher? 
MS. S1ARL1,; 
THE COURT: 
No. 
—or did you just know her as another 
oust know who~-uh huh (affirmative). 
Uould you have any tendency to favor 
the State in this natter because ^hc*s the prosecutor, as 
opposed to the defense? 
MS. SEARLE: 
TEE COURT: 
fair and impartial? 
MS. SRATXE: 
TEE COURT: 
You think that yon could be totally 
Vo<5 . 
Thank you. Anybody else? 
3 1 
EXHIBIT "A' 
1
 tendency to give greater weight to the testimony of a law 
2
 enforcement officer as opposed to the testimony of someone 
else because of that fact alone? 
4
 UNIDENTIFIED FbMALE JUROR: I don't believe so. 
5
 THE COURT: Thank you. 
6 1 
Is there anyone on the jury panel who has such 
strong feelings against the use of alcohol, whether those 
8
 are just—not just; but whether those are a personal belief, 
9
 or that they're also in part based upon religion that you 
10
 could—that you feel that you could not be fair and impartial 
tt in this case? Anyone? 
12
 Are there any r. embers on the jury panel who 
13 I abstain from drinking any type of alcoholic beverage, 
14
 including beer? 
15
 Let's have you keep your bands up for just a 
16
 rnonient so Counsel can take note, 
17
 T/FIDj-.l;,rIFlxJD il?l>£, JUROR- Uhat was the question, 
18
 sir? 
^ Till: COURT: The wiiastior. i s . are there any members 
20
 'on the jury panel who abstain from drinking any type of 
alcoholic beverage, including beer? 
Thank you very nuch. 
Do any of the -errbers on the jury panel believe it 
is morally wrong to drink an alcoholic beverace or beer? I 
know that's a hard question and it's--the phrasing of it is 
?? 
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different. If you feel that it's morally wrong to drink an 
alcoholic beverage or beer, please raise your hand. Thank 
you. 
i'~r. Gottfreason, given that belief, do you still 
feel that you can be fair and impartial in this case today? 
:u.. Gv/rTrRjL-iL'bO: •: L tnink :-:o. i've served m a — 
as a bishop and in bishoprics for 13 years, and Ifve 
counseled a lot of people about things Like this because of 
the problems that it causer-; in their hone. 
2Hii COURT; Ail right. Oh^ .nk you, sir. _ 
Do any of the jurors believe that because a person 
is accused of a violation of the lav; that that person is 
guilty unless he can show otherwise? Do any of you have 
that feeling or opinion? 
IT.. ZACbR; Your lienor, I believe h"r. Hinckley 
rr.ight have also had his hand raised. 
•TI£L COURT; On the question, do you thin'-: it's 
rr.orally wrong to drink an alcoholic beverage or beer; did 
you raise your hand on that, i!r. Hinckley? 
I'ri sorry, 1 didn't—I f,n not as observant as I 
should be. In spite of that belief, do you still feel you 
can be fair and impartial to both sides, rriven your earlier 
response-that we have on the record on the other natter 
involvincr the accident ,ror>* wi "F*» had? 
;• 113.. HI1;CT.'LLY; I think it's Morally wrong, but I 
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THE COURT: Thank you. 
KR. ZAGERi Following would be No. 4, Phillip 
Hinckley. He's the individual who knows Charlie Beeder, the 
main officer in this case, knows his dad quite well. 
Although he stated that he would be able to be fair, I think 
the fact that he knows the family, knows the boy growing up, 
it's going to be very difficult for him to distrust a long-
time family relation and friend. Ee also stated that hev f elt 
it was morally wrong to drink. And for those reasons, I 
would move to preempt for cause. 
TSL COURT: All right. 
KS. ZAGiiK: The next juror I have a problem with is 
Juror Ko. 5, that would be Claudia Vance. She knows Bonnie 
Schaeffer, and although I didn't have a problem with N o . — 
Marjean Sawyer and Ann dearie for knowing each other, I did 
notice that when you asked the question, would they be 
influenced by each other's decision, that Bonnie Schaeffer 
leaned over to Claudia Vance and said, "Vie could be fair, 
couldn't we", I mean, so it seemed to be, even from watching 
what was taking place in the jury box, that she was asking 
for reassurance from the other juror who is the friend of 
hers, which seemed to answer the question about fairness 
better than her actual answer. And I would move to preempt 
her for cause. 
The next one I would preempt for cause would be 
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r,arl Laycock, No. 6 on ny list—I'm sorry, Jack Hill, excuse 
me. Jack Hill, for reasons that he teaches driver's 
education and the effects of alcohol, and instead of an 
affirmative yes to the question of whether he could be fair, 
he said he thought he could be, and the hesitation there 
would lead me to move for a preemptory by cause. 
The next juror I would move for preemption for 
cause, I know I've already mentioned, excuse me,' Phillip 
Hinckley, and I notice in my notes also, Phillip Hinckley 
is the individual whose wife was involved in a traffic 
accident due to a DUX or an alcohol-related experience, and 
he said he didn't feel good about that experience, when 
asked if he could be fair and impartial. So, that would be 
another basis for Phillip Hinckley. 
The final cne that I would move to preempt for 
cause would be Ann Searle, for two reasons. Number one, she 
does know another juror who's in the jury box; but more 
importantly, she knows Sherry Ragan, they, taught school 
together. Again, I think a person is influenced by those 
they know as acquaintances, and I think the natural instinct 
would be more inclined to go with her friend and acquaintance,] 
Sherry Raga, and I think that would bias her and make her 
unfair and unfit as a jurcr. 
Those are all the ones I have, Judge. 
THxJ COURT; Well, if I strike all of those people, 
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Counsel has also asked to excuse for cause Glen Gottfredson 
for the reasons stated, I have a feeling from Mr. Gottfredsoj 
that he feels "he can be fair and impartial; in fact, he feels 
that he has counseled people with drinking problems. He 
didn't seem to have any distaste for someone that drinks, but 
he did feel it was morally wrong, but said that he could be 
fair and impartial. So, lfn going to deny the motion to 
excuse hixa for cause. 
And I'n also going to deny the motion to excuse for 
cause or objection to those jurors Claudia Vance and Lonnie 
Schaeffer. The Court did not have any feeling or opinion that) 
they could not be totally independent and exercise their own 
judgment without deferring to the other because they happen 
to work at the same place. 
And let's see, Counsel? 
IIJR. ZAGLR: Ho. 11, Ann Gearle, 
TIIL COURT: You objected to her, and v/ould you 
restate your reason for that one? 
fill. ZAGhR: First, being acquainted with and 
knowing and working with the prosecutor. 
2E5S COURT: Oh, yes .„ The Court will deny your 
kaotion to strike her. I felt that was a fairly tenuous 
Relationship, they just knew each other as teachers soine ten 
24 Wears ago, and they didn't seen t o — I asked her specifically 
25 B.f she would tend to favor the State because of having known 
39 
1 it was at the area of 6800 South and 68—SR-68. excuse me, 
2 6800 ITorth and 68, SR 68. 
3 Q What city would that be closest to? 
* A It would be west of Lehi. It's in the county area, 
5 but it would be about four miles west of Lehi. 
6 Q Okay. When you say J.t's in the county area, 
7 you're referring to Utah County? 
8 A That's correct. 
9 Q All right. What were your duties on that occasion? 
10 A My duties as the sergeant was to supervise the 
n proceedings of my team, to insure safety in the area as far 
12 as is related to the flow of traffic, and also the officers 
13 in their interaction with those people who were stopped. 
14 Q Okay. Did you have occasion to observe the 
15 defendant's vehicle on this date? 
16 A Yes. I did. 
17 Q Okay. And could you describe when and where you 
18 first saw his vehicle? 
19 J A It was a red pickup
 f> I think about a 1 9 6 — o r 19 — 
what was i t — ' 6 7 red Chevy pickup. It was headed northbound 
on Highway 68, SR-68, they call it. 
Q And did he enter the roadblock area? 
A Yes. He did. 
Q And what did you do upon his entering that area? 
A He was headed northbound on that road and cane to 
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KR. ZAG^R: Objection, your Honor. Just for the 
record, I'd like to make an objection that we would make a 
continuing objection for the ease of the Court for any other 
evidence that's brought in subsequent to the roadblock on 
our—based on our underlying motion. 
Till] COURT: £11 right. Overruled. 
You may proceed. 
8
 Q (By Ms. Ragan) What did you observe about the 
9
 I defendant? 
A At that point in time, he rolled down his window 
and I started a conversation with him. I asked him if I 
12
 | could check his driver's license and recristration. I 
13
 I observed the defendant, sitting at the table there in the 
14
 'blue shirt, as the driver of this vehicle. He started to 
converse with me, he stated he did not have his driver's 
license with him. As he was checking a few other things out, 
I was—had the occasion to get right close to the door, and 
could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage on his breath. 
I also observed that his eyes were bloodshot and glassy. 
At that point in time, there was other traffic 
approaching. I motioned to Officer—-or Deputy Beeder, who 
was over at the other side of the road, to come to me, and 
to start to check out this individual, and I made a verbal 
statement to him that I think ve have a problem here, and at 
that time, I asked the driver to pull to the side of the road, 
ii. 
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has to be 
Til*, COURT: All right. Do you have the—well, it 
a certified transcript of the tape* 
i-IR. ZAGER: I requested one,. Let me show your 
Honor what I've received. 
to try to 
copy of a 
tape. 
I'm just 
Q 
any laws, 
A 
Q 
fact that 
A 
Q 
anproache 
A 
the door 
This is the tape I received front the Court. 
THi: COURT: Okay. I understand that, but in order 
impeach his testimony, you have to have a certified 
transcript, transcribed from the original court 
£iR. ZAGL-R: This is what I have. 
THi; COURT: J.'ell, I know that's what you have, but 
indicating to ycu what you need to have, okay? 
IIR. SAGL'R: So, your Honor would not allow this in? 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. 2AG.&R: Thank you, Judge. 
(By Mr. Zager) Did you observe Ilr. ITovosel break 
traffic laws while approaching? 
No. 
And the reason he was stopped solely was due to the 
it was a roadblock? 
That's correct. 
Okay. Thank you. Now, you mentioned that when you 
d Ilr. Ncvosel, you smelled an odor of alcohol? 
That's correct. I had occasion to move right up to 
and talk to him very, very close. Face-to-face. 
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involved and aware of the defendant in this case? 
2 I A Yes. I was at the check roadblock with Sergeant 
3 Tracy and some other deputies at the time. I was called the 
4 attention of llr. Novosel at the time when Sergeant Tracy askecji 
5 me to come over and stated to me that he believed there was 
6 a problem with Mr. Ilovosel, he could smell alcohol on his 
7 breath, and he wanted me to check him further. 
3 Q Okay. Did anyone assist you in that? 
A Ho. I don't believe so. 
U Okay. Do you recall when you first saw llr. llovoselj 
what you observed? 
A I do not recall what he was wearing. It was a 
warm day. I do recall that from talking to him, asking hin 
if he would do some field tests of such, I did recall that I 
smelled a mild but noticeable odor of alcohol coming from 
his breath. 
Q Okay. Anything else before you performed the field 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 t e s t s ? 
19 
20 
A No 
Q Okay. Would you just describe what is the purpose 
21 | of having them perform some field tests? 
22 | A It's an early basic recognition. It's another point| 
23 , of fact in intoxication level, distinguishable by a person 
24 I that's been trained to recognize that the person is under 
25 the influence to a degree incapable that they can safely 
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described that you smelled a mild odor of alcohol on his 
breath? 
A I didn't approach the vehicle. I approached 
llr. Uovosel. 
Q When you approached rir. Novosel, was he still in 
the vehicle? 
A IJo. He was out. 
Q And you cane up to llr. 1-Tovosel, and what happened? 
Did you ask hin a question or something along those lines? 
A I asked h i n — I don't recall what questions a year 
and a half ago, I probably said, what were you doing, where 
have you been, something like that. I could snell the 
alcohol, nild, on his breath, hitting ne in the face. 
U At that tine, you smelled what you've described 
as a nild odor of alcohol? 
A Uh huh (affirmative),. 
Q Is it true that someone who drinks more can have a 
stronger odor of alcohol than someone who hasn't drank as 
much; is that possible? 
A Ko. I wouldn't describe it that way. I would 
describe in what they've drank. 
Q Okay. 
A Hild is something of the beer fashion, when you 
get into the other things that are real—the whiskeys and 
stuff are a lot stronger, you can smell the alcohol easier, 
-26. 
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A 
area. 
C 
up there? 
A 
C 
the sand 
I've never attended then. I've been around the 
Okay. Is there a lot of dust and dirt and sand 
Yeah. The races are in the sand. 
And on a hot day, when ycu sweat, and the dust and 
blowing, is it possible that someone's eyes could 
become irritated and Lccorre rcduened, uithout drinking 
alcohol? 
; 
r 
this: Af 
when you 
way? 
A 
r 
you asked 
A 
Q 
A 
c 
A 
C 
i 
G 
Possibly. 
irhen you first approached Mr. —v-jll, let me ask you 
ter you did—you spoke with Ilr. Xovosel initially, 
first iret with hi*:; was hie speech slurred in any 
No. 
Did he answer appropriately to the questions that 
hiiu? 
Yes. 
Okay. So, his responses were prompt? 
Yes. 
And he was in fact quite conversant with you? 
Yeah. He was talkative. 
Okay. And was he polite and courteous? 
Yes. 
Before you even began the first field test, just 
_ 2J2 « 
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from your brief encounter with I!r. Hovosel, did you then 
form the opinion that Mr, Ilovosel was intoxicated? 
A So. I concluded at .that time that I could smell 
alcohol on his breath; I did not conclude that he was 
intoxicated, 
Q And you realize there's nothing against the law 
about drinking and driving, per se, if you haven't exceeded 
the legal limit or — 
As explained by the Code, yeah. 
'J So, there was nothing, no problem with the fact 
that he merely snelled of alcohol? 
A So. 
C: Okay. Then you required I!r. Ilovosel to perform 
sore field tests? 
A That's correct. 
rZ Okay, !Tow, you stated that you studied over at 
POST, isn't it true that POST teaches basically three 
standardised field 'sobriety tests? 
A The Highway Patrol uses those tests. 
Q Ohay. 
A Through the Department of Public Safety. It's one 
of their ways o f — t h e y hand out a little pamphlet that they 
go by, they ask their officers to stay, you know, if they 
can, by thc^e tests. 
Q And the hand-slap test isn't one of those that i s — 
OQ 
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as fast as he could? 
A I tell them to go to a speed that is comfortable, 
and he can go as fast as he likes, yeah. 
Q So, when someone is trying to go as fast as they 
can, they really don't realize how fast they can go until 
they go that fast and make a mistake and realize that that 
was too fast for them to go; is that correct? 
A Could be. 
U So he started the test, and did he go pretty 
quickly in the beginning, that you recall? 
A He speeded up, yeah, and got to a point where he 
was double slapping. 
y And he started over again. 
A Uh huh (affirmative). 
Q And did he finally complete the test? 
A Yeah. 
\2 Okay. Did you give him instructions, or I think 
we've talked about it; is it true you gave him instructions 
on how to perform the test? 
A That's correct. 
U Okay. What was his ability to follow the 
instructions? 
A lie easily understood what I was explaining to him 
and he verbalized without problems. 
w So, his ability to follow the instructions was 
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good? 
A Uh huh (affirmative).. 
Q Okay. Typically, someone's who has had too much 
to drink, and often your clue into this is that you look for 
someone who can't follow the instructions as a clue to 
intoxication? 
A That is one of the clues. If they're totally 
drunk, totally intoxicated to a point where they're, you 
know, slobbering drunk, which everyone suspects people to be, 
of course, they're going to have problems with understanding 
the test. 
Q But that wasn't the case here? 
A No. He was not a sLobbering drunk. 
Q Excuse me for the question. His problem wasn't one 
in following instructions or not, he did that good; is that 
correct? 
A Yeah. 
Q There is a portion on your report on a subject's 
ability to follow the instructions, can you—you didn't fill 
that portion out, did you? 
A No. 
Q After Mr. Ncvosel performed and completed the hand-
slap test, did you form an opinion then as to whether you 
24
 thought he was intoxicated? 
A I try not to form my opinion until all the test 
10? 
1 Q Okay. So, out of those ten points, Kr. Novosel 
2
 I would have one point? 
3 
4 
A Well, two. On the walking do™n the line to remove 
himself out of the plane of the straight line, that would be 
5
 J another point; so there would be two. 
Q Okay. Let's say that Mr. Novosel scored two 
points on this; isn't it true that the POST manual says that 
8
 if someone scored more than tv/o points, they failed the 
9
 test? 
10
 I A Yeah. That's one of the clues, 
Q Okay. So, on this heel-toe test, at least, 
12
 | llr. Novosel, it would be safe to say, he passed this test? 
13
 I A Yeah. Pe scored two out of the ten, if that's 
14
 I what you say there was. 
ii So, he passed the heel-toe test? 
A He had tho^e errors, but he would have passed, 
17
 | yeah. 
0 Okay, Cut despite the fict that he passed the 
test, you arrested hin for DUI? 
11 
15 
16 
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19 
20
 I A Yeah. I had another test that was not included 
21
 I in the Court today, but which cave me a better indication. 
22
 I MR. ZAOLR: Objection. And move to strike, 
23 I THL COURT: Well, I think it's been alluded to by 
2
* J both parties, *nd I won't comment further on it, 
25
 I y (By llr. Zager) And the heel-toe test was the 
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It's sort—ascertained by the Highway Patrol, they require 
a maximum of two clues or more, greater than that to presume 
under a certain influence. That's only based on their 
opinion at that time. 
Q Okay. But to restate your testimony earlier, he 
did, in fact, in your opinion, pass the heel-toe test? 
A Yeah, He did okay. 
Kli. ZAGJL!?.: TTo further questions. 
TIIU COURT: You can step down, Officer. 
MS. RAGV-I: Call Officer Gary Taylor. 
THE COURT: Step down, Officer Beeder. 
Could you ask him to come in, please? 
OFFICER BEED"CR: Yeah, 
THE COURT: Trooper Taylor, you've been placed 
under oath. Would you please take the witness stand? Thank 
you. 
MR. 2AGi-R: Your Honor, for brevity, might I just 
consult with the prosecutor for a moment? 
TIlii COURT: In the name of brevity, you can consult 
all you want. 
(Whereupon, an off-the-record discussion was had 
between counsel.) 
TIP- COURT: You may proceed, Counsel. 
M'J. RAGA1I: Po you mind if I state that? 
MR. ZAGKR: If you can do so. 
i n o I 
1 Q —concerning what Mr. IJovosel claims to have had 
2
 to drink, in fact, he says he had six beers. Now, without 
3 
4 
7 
11 
putting you through any calculations because I know we've 
already done that outside the courtroom, so I'll spare you 
5
 I that; is it your conclusion that it would not be possible 
6
 I to tell what iir. Novosel's blood alcohol was at the time 
he was driving unless the breath test was performed at the 
8
 I time he was actually driving? 
9
 A To know what he was right at that time, that's 
10
 I correct. 
Q Okay, So, this .11, which was taken some 45 
12
 | minutes later is not indicative of what llr. Novosel's blood 
13
 I alcohol was at the time he was driving; is that correct? 
14
 I A That should be correct. 
Q bo, in fact, if Iir. Novosel had consumed a large 
portion of his alcohol at a time close to driving, is it 
possible that that alcohol was not into his system at the 
time he was driving, yet was in his system to a larger 
19 I extent at the tirae that he took the breath test 45 minutes 
20 later? 
21 J A That's possible. 
U Is it also possible under that scenario that 
23 I Mr. IJovosel may have been under the legal limit at the time 
24 he was driving? 
25
 A Could have been. Ilobody knows, would know. 
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TROOrER TAYLOR: Thank you, 
THII COURT; Thank you. 
(Whereupon, the jury was excused from the 
courtroom.) 
MR. SAGi-R; Your Honor, at this tine, I v/ould move 
for a motion for a directed verdict on the charge. I rhink 
my motion is well taken and v/ould present it as follows: 
8
 J First, let me make my motion on the second part of 
the DUI statute, v/hich says that a person is guilty of a DUI 
if he is under the influence of any alcohol or drug or the 
combined influence of alcohol or drug, to a degree which 
renders the person incapable of safely driving a vehicle, to 
13
 | drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle in this 
14
 I State. 
15
 ' I have not heard evidence that says Ilr. ITovosel was 
unable to safely Irive his vehicle; in fact, the evidence has 
been to the contrary. Lach Officer who has seen Ilr. Kovosel 
drive, actually it was just the one officer Tracy, has 
stated that he saw hr. L'ovosei approach the roadblock, he 
seemed to slow up and hesitate, but he violated no traffic 
21
 | laws and drove in a normal and safe manner. I think that goe^ 
right to the heart of the statute, I don't think there's been 
any evidence to ^resent that ilr. ilovosel, number one, drove 
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 his vehicle in an unsafe manner and if he did, i t was a 
25 result of alcohol. So, I would move that your Honor take 
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that issue from the jury and move the Court to direct a 
verdict acquitting 2ir. Novosel on that portion of the charge. 
On the other part, the .08, it's a little more 
difficult, but I would also move the Court to dismiss that 
count, that portion of the DUI charge, because it's the 
State's burden of proof, to be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and Officer Baylor's testimony that it is possible 
that Mr. Novosel was under that legal limit at the time he 
was driving, and that's the State's witness, that it would 
not be possible for the jury to come back with a guilty 
verdict, finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Ilr. Novosel 
was over the .08 when driving, when considering the fact that 
Mr. Taylor says it's possible that he was under. And in 
view of the other evidence, when Mr. Novosel passes the 
heel-toe test, drives fine, speech is good, and all the 
other things we've discussed in Court today, a jury would not 
be proper in coming back with a guilty verdict, and I'd ask 
the Court to dismiss — 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. ZAG£R: —direct a verdict. 
TH£ COUST: Thank you, Counsel. I'll let the 
prosecutor respond. 
ll&. RAGAN: I don't agree. I don't think I need to 
say any more than that. I think there's enough evidence 
certainly for them to find him guilty if they believe the 
•A4d-
witnesses, Judge, 
Officer Taylor said it is also possible for him to 
have been higher than the .11, so we think that's 
significant, and I ask you not t o — I don't think there is 
5
 J such a thing as a directed verdict in criminal cases. I 
suppose he's asking for a dismissal, and I would ask the 
Court to dt*ny that motion. 
8
 I TILC COUR'J: Okay. I'll let you respond, M r . — m y 
9
 mind is starting to go. 
1 0 J MR. "SAGuR: Zager. 
THE COURT: I'm sorry. 
MR. ZAGLR: I'm sorry, Judge. 
T E L COURT; Mr. Sager. 
MR. ZAGER: Your Honor, only to reiterate that 
there's been absolutely no evidence at all that Ilr. Ilovosel 
did not safely drive his vehicle; in fact, the evidence has 
17
 | been that he has safely and prudently drove his vehicle. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, that certainly isn't 
the only standard or the only evidence that the jury or the 
20 I Court should or would look at. Officer Tracy testified that 
21 J he had had numerous experience with people under the 
influence of alcohol and gave his opinion that Mr. Novosel 
23 I was intoxicated at the time, based upon the totality of the 
24 circumstances. And that was before Officer Beeder did 
25 anything, performed the field sobriety tests or had him take 
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 the intoxilyzer test. 
2
 I think both officers had a very limited opportunity 
3
 to observe any driving at all, and so I think that's a matter 
that lies within the sound discretion of the jury. 
5
 With respect to the other alternative, whether he 
6
 was over .03 or not, it's undisputed at this point in tine, 
7
 J anyway, that 45 minutes after being stopped, there was a 
test result of .11; given the statute of 41- 6-44.5, it talks 
9
 about the giving of the test and if it was within two hours— 
10 well, it says if the chemical test was taken more than two 
11 hours after the alleged driving or actual physical control, 
12 the test is admissible as evidence of the person's blood or 
13 breath alcohol content at the tine of the alleged operating 
14
 or actual physical control, but the trier of fact shall 
15 determine what weight is given—what weight is given to the 
16
 result of the test. Which seems to imply if it was within 
17
 two hours, then there's almost a presumption, it doesn't use 
18
 the word presumption, but it's certainly stronger if it was 
19 within two hours. That again is, I think, lies within the 
20 sound discretion of the jury to make that determination. 
21 The Court determines that there is, at this point, 
22 sufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury on both 
23 alternative theories, so the Court will deny the motion to 
24 dismiss. 
25 Do counsel want a brief recess before we proceed 
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don't like real heavy barbequed foods, they don't settle 
right; I had a couple sandwiches and I did have beers with 
ny sandwiches. 
Q Okay. About what time period are we talking about 
before you left? 
A I don't know. Well, it's around this tine of day, 
it was dinner tine, it nay have been later, because the only 
tiro I really pay attention to a cloc^ is the one that wakes 
ne up in the morning. And I'd say between, say, 5:00, 5:45, 
somewhere around there, approximately, }ust--
Q About how long did it take you to eat your sand-
wiches? 
A It doesn't take iue long. I probably ate my 
sancwiches and beers, 1 was hot and thirsty and hungry, and 
I'd say maybe, oh, ten-15 minutes, if that. I don't know, 
U £o you know how ir.any i^ eers you ha a within that 
half hour period before you got in your vehicle with Jeff? 
A I had one before I ate, and tnen I had one with 
each sandwich to help wash it down, ^ut then the wife give 
me a list to go get some soda pop and chips for the kids 
to spend the night with us, and I nev^r did make it. 
u So, it was three beers then that you had within, 
say, a half hour or so? 
A x^ah. 
Q When the officer asked you what you had to drink 
• * * 1 
1
 881303, both counsel are present as is the defendant and the 
2 jury members have returned ana are now seated in the jury box 
3
 after notifying our clerk who acts as bailiff t o — t h a t they 
4
 had arrived at a verdict. 
5 And let's see, is it lir..'.Mcmullen who is acting as 
6
 the jury xoraaan; is tnat correct? 
8 i1liu COUACI.4: And have you arrivea at a verdict? 
10 i'li^  CutL-Cx. Ana you've given cAat verdict" form to 
11 tne cier^; is chat correct? 
12 i^c. ilCi/uLL^l,; Viiat is correct. 
13 'ilLu COujtv'i: Ana the reeora will show the clerk has 
14 handeu it to :::e. 
15 1 would at tnis tiue tnen ask .J:. :*ovosel, if you 
16 would, sir, to btand, witn your attorney, and ±'11 read the 
17 veraict to you. 
18 ;<Ci/ the jurors in the aixrw case, find tne defendant^, 
19 uoseph llovojei, guilty or ^ul. ^i^neu oy nr. i^cliuilen, the 
20 3ury rorenan. 
21 At your request, Counsel, X would be glad to poll 
22 the jury rneiabers to see it this is still their verdict. 
23 IiK. ZAGJUU: Thank you, Judge. i wouia lir.e to 
24 know that. 
25 THLc CUUKi; Yes , s i r . 'Jhanfc you . P l e a s e be 
201 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
seated th 
verdict? 
verdict? 
verdict? 
verdict? 
tine, the 
marvelous 
feel—-you 
that you 
en. 
Marjean Sawyer, was this and is this still your 
MRS. SAWYLK: Yes. 
THii COURT: Thank you. 
And Claudia Vance, was this and is this still your 
I-^ \5. VAKCL: Ye s. 
TlLu COUKT: xhank you. 
And LaRene Peay, was this and is this still your 
(Inaudible) 
THii COURT: Thank you. 
And iir. Hckullen, was tnis and is this still your 
hR. licMULLiill: Yes. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much, folks. At this 
Court v/ill discharge you. ThanK you for a 
job, we appreciate your service. I hone that you 
might be a little bit tired at this point, but 
feel satisfied that you've performed your jury 
i l 
service well, and you've done a fine job, and we, in behalf 
of the counsel and the parties, I know we really appreciate 
it, so we 111 let you go at this time. 
Also, we have a one-day service rule in this 
2£2 
MITCHEL ZAGER - 3968 !R R2 :Q3 
Attorney for Defendant 
3167 West 4700 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118 
Telephone (801) 964-6100 
IN THE FIRST PRECINCT COURT, CITY OF PLEASANT GROVE 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
: MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
Plaintiff, : OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
TO DISMISS 
vs. : 
: Case No. 1-7437-87 
JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL, : 
Defendant. 
ooOoo—— 
COMES NOW defendant, JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL, by and through 
his attorney of record, Mitchel Zager, and hereby moves this 
Honorable Court to suppress all evidence obtained after the 
unlawful stop at the roadblock herein, or, in the alternative, to 
dismiss, based on the case law cited, surrounding factual 
circumstances, and upon oral argument at time of this motion. 
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about August 1, 1987, Saturday, at 6:24 PM, 
defendant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL was stopped at a roadblock at SR-68 
at 6800 North, Lehi, Utah. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and 
incorporated herein by reference is the DUI report form. 
2. On August 1, 1987, JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL was arrested 
and charged with a DUI. (See Exhibit "A".) 
3. That the officers at the roadblock observed no 
1 
EXHIBIT "B" 
traffic or equipment violations nor any suspicious activity prior 
to the stop. (See Exhibit "A".) 
4. There is no record of the time the roadblock was 
set up and dismantled. Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and 
incorporated by reference herein is plaintiff's response to 
defendant's second set of discovery, answer No. 1. 
5. There was no record of the names of the officers at 
the roadblock at the time of the defendant's arrest. (See 
Exhibit "B" attached hereto, answer No. 2.) 
6. There were no advertisements nor media notice of 
the roadblock herein. (See Exhibit "B", answer No. 3.) 
7. There was no record of the number of persons 
stopped at the roadblock herein. (See Exhibit "B" answer T*o. 
7.) 
8. There was no record of the number of DUI arrests at 
the roadblock herein. (See Exhibit "B", answer No. 8.) 
9. There was no record of the number of other arrests 
at the roadblock herein. (See Exhibit "B", answer No. 9.) 
10. There was no record of the number of other 
citations given at the roadblock herein. (See Exhibit "B", 
answer No. 10.) 
11. The purpose for this roadblock was to check 
licenses, registrations and alcohol violators. (See Exhibit nBH, 
answer No. 15.) 
12. There was no record of any specific directions, 
guidelines, or instructions given to each officer concernincr *H~ 
2 
law enforcement and the roadblock. Attached hereto as Exhibit 
"C" and incorporated by reference herein are plaintiff's 
responses to defendant's third set of discovery, answer No. 1. 
13. No empirical data has been provided showing that 
roadblocks are more effective in dealing with the drunk driving 
problem than traditional roving patrols. (See Exhibit HCM, 
answer No. 2 and Exhibit "B", answer No. 13.) 
14. On August 1, 1987, Sand Drag Races were being held 
at the near proximity of the roadblock. 
15. Defendant NOVOSEL at the time of step did not have 
his license on him, was not cited for that offense. (See Exhibit 
"A" attached hereto.) 
16. No complaint, reports, nor extra patrol requests 
nor deputy's personal knowledge of the need for the roadblock as 
concerns alcohol violators have been provided. 
II. 
DUI ROADBLOCKS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
The Court of C r i m i n a l Appea l s of Oklahoma h e l d : 
T h a t t h e F o u r t h Amendment p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t an 
u n r e a s o n a b l e s e i z u r e of t h e p e r s o n i s v i o l a t e d by t h e 
u s e of a t e m p o r a r y r o a d b l o c k a s a means t o s t o p a l l 
t r a f f i c ( o r t r a f f i c a t e s t a b l i s h e d i n t e r v a l s ) w i t h o u t 
a n y a r t i c u l a b l e f a c t s g i v i n g r i s e t o a r e a s o n a b l e 
s u s p i c i o n fo r t h e s t o p , f o r t h e p u r p o s e of s e e k i n g ou t 
c r i m i n a l DUI o f f e n d e r s . S t a t e v . Smi th , 674 P . 2d, 
562, 565 (Okl . CR 1984) 
The S m i t h c o u r t s t a t e d t h a t t h e "end j u s t i f i e s t he 
means approach [ i n an a t t e m p t t o remove DUI o f f e n d e r s from t h e 
p u b l i c h i g h w a y s ] d r a w [ s ] d a n g e r o u s l y c l o s e t o wha t may be 
r e f e r r e d t o a s a p o l i c e s t a t e . " I d , a t 564 . The Smith cour t 
3 
recognized that "a basicr tenet of American jurisprudence is that 
government^Bannbtr assume criminal conduct in effectuating a stop 
such as the one presented herein." Id. 
The court in Smith recognized the potential abuse of 
establishing checkpoints to seek out criminals in their analogy 
concerning the logical extension of roadblocks leading to the 
establishment of checkpoints in every shopping center, to stop 
shoppers to check for purchase receipts. Jd. In Smith, as in 
the case at hand, there was "no statutory authority which would 
support, directly or indirectly, the State's contention that it 
has the power to establish checkpoints to inspect all motorists 
to discern if they are intoxicated." Jd, at 565. All of the 
evidence obtained at the roadblock in Smith was suppressed. 
The Utah District Court of Weber County also suppressed 
evidence obtained at a DUI roadblock. State v. ffolley, a copy of 
which is attached hereto for the court's convenience. In Holley, 
the Utah District Court adopted the reasoning in Smith, ruling 
that the roadblock in question was unconstitutional, despite 
evidence that the roadblock in question was professionally and 
safely conducted. Id. 
In our case, the State admits that the purpose of the 
roadblock was to seek out criminal DUI offenders. (Statement of 
Facts, No.11.) The cases cited above require a finding that such 
roadblocks are unconstitutional per se in their blatant violation 
of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
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III. 
THE STATE HAS THE BURDEN TO PROVE THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
VALIDITY OF A POLICE ROADBLOCK. 
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire recently stated the 
well-established rule that: 
. . . to justify the search or seizure of a motor 
vehicle, absent probable cause or even a reasonable 
suspicion that a criminal offense is being committed, 
the State must prove that its conduct significantly 
advances the public interest in a manner that out-
weighs the accompanying intrusion on individual rights. 
It must further prove that no less intrusive means are 
available to accomplish the Statefs goal. State v. 
Koppel, 499 A. 2nd, 977, 981 (N.H., 1985) 
The Supreme Court of Arizona recognized that roadblock 
stops of motor vehicles absent a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity is subject to a balancing test to determine the 
constitutionality of the roadblock. Ekstrom v. State of Arizona, 
663 P. 2d, 992, 994 (Ariz. 1983) In Ekstrom, the court was 
required to balance "the intrusion caused by the police conduct 
on an individual's fourth amendment interests . . . against . . . 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Id. The State 
*
n
 Ekstrom, as in the present case, failed to disclose statistics 
concerning the extent of the problem of drunk drivers, nor 
statistics supporting the effectiveness of roadblocks versus 
traditional roving patrols acting upon reasonable suspicion in 
dealing with the drunk driving problem. JEd, at 996. The facts 
in Ekstromf as in our case, show that officers are trained to 
detect drunk drivers on the road based on observations and that 
experienced officers become highly skilled at detecting drunk 
drivers by observing driving patterns and can, without 
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roadblocks, detect many drunk drivers. IdL. The court in Ekstrom 
concluded that "if there is an adequate method of enforcing the 
drunk driving statute, there is no pressing need for the use of 
an intrusive roadblock device." The Ekstrom court further stated 
that without empirical data, balancing the needs of the State 
against the individual rights cannot be conducted. The Ekstrom 
court upheld the Justice of the Peace's ruling that the roadblock 
was unconstitutional and in violation of the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and suppressed all the evidence 
obtained therein. Id. 
The case law cited requires the State to prove that the 
public interest in apprehending drunk drivers outweighs the 
intrusion entailed by a roadblock stop. Without empirical data, 
the State cannot meet its burden of demonstrating that the public 
interest is significantly advanced by establishing roadblocks. 
This court cannot perform the balancing test and the roadblock 
must be declared unconstitutional. 
IV. 
A ROADBLOCK IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL WHERE THE INTRUSION 
ON THE INDIVIDUAL OUTWEIGHS THE GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS. 
The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme Court s t a t e d : 
E x a 4 p t vibAre t h e r e i s a t l e a s t a r t i c u l a b l e a n d 
r e a s o n a b l e ^ s u s p i c i o n t h a t ) a m o t o r i s t i s uAlicezjsed or 
t l m t an j futomohfi le i s nojc r e g i s t e r e d , o r / t h ^ r x / e i t h e r 
t H e v e h i c l e o r / a n o c c u p a n t i s o c h e r w i s p su tr}ec t§ t o 
s e i z u r e ffor v i o l a t i o n o f l a w , s tropping 4 n au£onud^ile 
a i d d e t a i n i n g t l i e d r i v e r i n o r d e r t o c h e c j ^ / h i s d p i v f e r ' s 
l i c e n s e Wnd t h e r e g i s t r a t i o n o f W h e a u t o m o b i l e \ a r e 
u n r e a s o n a b l e under t h e F o u r t h Amendment. De laware v . 
P r o u s e , 99 S . C t . 1 3 9 1 , 1393 ( 1 9 7 3 ) 
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The Prouse court further stated: 
|fegifi£. The permissibility of a particular law enforce-
ment practice is judged by balancing its intrusion of 
the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Id. 
As stated above, the State cannot meet its burden 
because it has no records to support the degree that roadblocks 
promote governmental interests; and, therefore, a balancing of 
the interests is impossible herein. Nonetheless for purposes of 
argument, numerous factors considered by courts in applying the 
balancing test are: The amount of discretion the officer at the 
roadblock maintained; whether prior notices of the location and 
purpose of the roadblock were given to motorists to prevent 
surprise; whether the roadblock was a permanent roadblock or a 
temporary roadblock; the purpose of the roadblock; the time of 
day of the roadblock; and whether less intrusive methods were 
available to accomplish the alleged State's interests. Ekstrom 
v. State of Arizona, (supra); State v. Koppel, (supra); State v. 
Holley, (supra); State v. Smith, (supra); Delaware v. Prouse, 
(supra) ; State v. Marchand, 706 P. 2d, 225 (Wash. 1985); and 
State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W. 2d, 392, (S.D. 1976) Each of the 
courts recognized that the intrusion of the roadblock was too 
great and thereby held the roadblock unconstitutional. 
In Ekstrom, "Motorists were taken by surprise, not 
having had prior notice of location and purpose of the 
checkpoints." Ekstrom at 996. 
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In Koppel« it was found that an unpublicized temporary 
drunk driving roadblock set up at night: 
. . produces a substantially greater amount of 
"subjective intrusion—a generation of concern or even 
fright on the part of lawful travellers, . . . " 
(Martinez/Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558, 96 S.Ct. at 3083) 
than does a permanent roadblock whose existence and 
purpose are coamon knowledge. Koppel at 983. 
In the present case, there was no advertising nor prior 
media notice of the temporary roadblock which was set up in the 
evening hours. The officers at the roadblock were not given 
specific guidelines nor direction regarding the procedures to be 
followed at the roadblock. As in Ekstrom, as in the present 
case, officers 
. . . were not told what to do if a vehicle turned 
around to avoid the roadblock. They were not told 
whether to inspect visible cans or bottles. They were 
not told whether to shine a flashlight in each vehicle 
that was stopped after dark. They were not told 
whether to smell inside each vehicle tof detect the 
smell of alcohol. Ekstrom at 993. 
Even though vehicles in Ekstrom were detained from 30 to 40 
seconds to five minutes, the court held that the degree of 
intrusion in light of the surprise and fright occasioned on the 
motorists was a significant and substantial intrusion. Id. 
In Smith, the court stated: 
The roadblocks in the present case could well act, and 
most likely did act, as a total surprise to those 
passing through. The subjective intrusion, for 
example, fear and apprehension, potentially imposed 
upon the individual innocent of misconduct is simply 
too great. Smith at 564 (supra) 
In Ekstrom. the court found in that roadblock, "the 
grave danger that such discretion might be abused by the officer 
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in the field, a fact which caused the court in United States v. 
Prouse, (supra), much concern." Ekstrom at 996. 
In the case at hand, the roadblock, which was a 
temporary roadblock, was set up at dusk without prior notice to 
motorists approaching. Officers were left with considerable 
discretion as to how to operate the roadblock. As stated, the 
purpose of this roadblock was to check for drunk drivers. This 
roadblock is unconstitutional for those important defects stated 
hereinabove. As held consistently throughout the cases cited, 
there are less intrusive methods are available to apprehend drunk 
drivers; namely, traditional roving patrols where officers are 
trained and skilled to observe driving patterns to apprehend 
drunk drivers. As stated in Prouse, the United States Supreme 
Court found that: 
. . . the foremost method of enforcing .traffic and 
vehicle safety regulations, it must be recalled, is 
acting upon observed violations. Vehicles stopped for 
traffic violations occur countless times each day; and 
on these occasions licenses and registration papers are 
subject to inspection and drivers without them will be 
ascertained. Furthermore, drivers without licenses are 
presumably the less safe drivers whose propensities may 
well exhibit themselves. Absent some empirical data to 
the contrary, it must be assumed that finding an 
unlicensed driver among those who commit traffic 
violations is a much more likely event than finding an 
unlicensed driver by choosing randomly from the entire 
universe of drivers. Prouse at 1399 (supra) 
In the conclusion by the Supreme Court of Marchand, the 
court stated: 
We draw this conclusion from the rationale of Prouse: 
"Were the individual subject to unfettered governmental 
intrusion every time he entered an automobile, his 
security guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would be 
seriously circumcised." 
* 
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V. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court, as c i t e d above, ru led as a matter of 
law thidt r o a d b l o c k s x h i c h s t o p m o t o r i s t s wi thout s u s p i c i o n of 
criminal a c t i v i t y for the purpose of checking on p o s s i b l e alcohol 
v i o l a t o r s i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l per s e and i n v i o l a t i o n of the 
F o u r t h and F o u r t e e n t h Amendments t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s 
Cons t i tu t ion . 
Other c o u r t s i n the c a s e s c i t e d h e r e i n s t a t e that in 
l i m i t e d c i rcumstances the roadblock may be proper f ind ing that 
t h e S t a t e has the burden of proving c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v a l i d i t y of 
the roadblock i n q u e s t i o n . The c our t s have required a balancing 
t e s t whereby t h e g o v e r n m e n t a l i n t e r e s t s f u r t h e r e d by the 
roadblock outweigh the i n d i v i d u a l ' s Fourth Amendment r i g h t to be 
f ree from unreasonable s earch and s e i z u r e s . The* c o u r t s , i n these 
i n s t a n c e s , have required tha t the S t a t e provide empir ica l data to 
p r o v e t h a t t h e r o a d b l o c k i s t h e l e a s t i n t r u s i v e and most 
e f f e c t i v e means f o r e n f o r c i n g the drunk d r i v i n g s t a t u t e s . In 
t h i s c a s e , the record i s s i l e n t as the S t a t e f a i l s t o produce any 
s t a t i s t i c s t o p r o v e t h e d e g r e e o f e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f t h i s 
roadblock. Furthermore, i t i s c l e a r tha t more e f f e c t i v e and l e s s 
i n t r u s i v e means for e n f o r c i n g drunk d r i v i n g laws are a v a i l a b l e to 
t h e S t a t e i n t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l procedures of s k i l l e d o f f i c e r s 1 
o b s e r v a t i o n s of d r i v i n g p a t t e r n s of s u s p e c t e d drunk d r i v i n g 
v i o l a t o r s whi le proceeding a s a roving p a t r o l . The S t a t e , having 
f a i l e d t o produce such e m p i r i c a l data support ing that prong of 
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the balancing test cannot prove that the roadblock herein was 
constitutional. 
Even assuming for argument sake that the State can show 
that the roadblock is the most effective and least intrusive 
means of enforcing the DUI statute, this particular roadblock is 
unquestionably unconstitutional. The roadblock was set up in the 
evening hours for a purpose of checking for DUI violators. There 
wac no advance notice given of this roadblock; therefore, 
motorists approaching the roadblock were subject to considerable 
surprise and fright, causing a substantial and significant 
intrusion in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The officers at 
the roadblock were not given specific procedural directions in 
implementing the roadblock. Substantial discretion was left to 
each officer at the roadblock. The intrusion on motorists, was, 
therefore, subject to abuse. There is no statutory authority 
which authorizes the establishment of this roadblock. For these 
reasons, the operation of this roadblock is unconstitutional. 
Defendant respectfully moves this Honorable Court to 
grant defendant's motion to suppress all the evidence obtained at 
the roadblock and, in the alternative, to dismiss all charges 
against this defendant with prejudice. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /6 day of November, 1987. 
• ffitchel Zage£/ // 
Attorney for Defendant 
11 
MITCHEL ZAGER - 3968 
Attorney for Defendant 
3167 West 4700 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34118 
Telephone (801) 964-6100 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT - AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
: MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
Plaintiff, : OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
: TO DISMISS 
vs. : 
: Case No. 1-7437-87 
JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL, 
Defendan t . 
ooOoo 
COMES NOW d e f e n d a n t , JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL, by arid t h rough 
h i s a t t o r n e y of r e c o r d , M i t c h e l Zage r , and he reby moves t h i s 
H o n o r a b l e C o u r t t o s u p p r e s s a l l e v i d e n c e o b t a i n e d a f t e r t h e 
u n l a w f u l q u e s t i o n i n g and d e t e n t i o n of d e f e n d a n t , JOSEPH A. 
NOVOSEL, o r , i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , t o d i s m i s s a l l c h a r g e s w i t h 
p r e j u d i c e . T h i s m o t i o n i s b a s e d on t h e c a s e law c i t e d , 
s u r r o u n d i n g f a c t u a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s , and upon o r a l argument a t t ime 
of h e a r i n g of t h i s mo t ion . 
I . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about August 4, 1987, defendant JOSEPH A. 
NOVOSEL was stopped at a roadblock at SR-68, at 6800 North, Lehi, 
Utah. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated by 
reference herein is the DUI Report. 
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EXHIBIT "C" 
2. Following the road'block stop, defendant JOSEPH A. 
NOVOSEL was detained improperly and was required to perform a 
field sobriety test. 
3. The sole basis for requiring a field sobriety test 
was the officers impression that he smelled a mild odor of 
alcohol and observed reddened eyes. 
II. 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 14, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
WERE VIOLATED BY THE UNJUSTIFIED STOP AND CONTINUED 
DETENTION OF DEFENDANT; THEREFORE, ALL THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED 
THEREBY MUST BE SUPPRESSED. 
The United States Supreme Court landmark case of Terry 
v. Ohio stated that, "It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment 
governs 'seizures1 of the person . . .". Tgrry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, at 16 (1967). 
*
n
 Terry, the Court continued, "It must be recognized 
that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and 
restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized1 that person." 
Id. 
The Oregon Court of Appeals in State v. Gibbons, citing 
the Terry case, stated: 
A holding of the person, no matter how minor, is a 
"seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
even though no arrest has occurred. State v. Gibbons, 
535 P. 2d, 561 (1975), citing Terry at 16. 
The Gibbons court reviewed a long line of cases concerning 
unjustified stops and stated: 
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The distinguishing feature in this case is that the 
defendant was signalled by a police patrol car to pull 
over and stop; her compliance with this signal cannot 
be viewed as her own uncoerced choice. She was, in a 
real sense, compelled to submit to the officer's 
presence; she was detained. Gibbons, at 564. 
The Gibbons court, quoting State v. Evans, stated: 
Restraint of liberty can arise either by means of 
physical force or show of authority, . . . and the 
constraint of volition is equally real whether it 
arises by implication from the color of authority of 
the police or from their express command. Id., citing 
State v. Evans, 517 P. 2d, 1225, 1223 (1974), Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. at 19. 
In the case at hand, defendant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL was 
stopped at a roadblock. He was then confronted by Sergeant 
Tracy, whose role it was, according to his testimony at a prior 
hearing, to "stand back and supervise." Sergeant Tracy further 
testified at Defendant's Motion to Suppress based upon an 
improper roadblock that th^re was nothing unusual about Mr. 
NOVOSELfs driving pattern when approaching the roadblock. 
Sergeant Tracy went on to state that Mr. NOVOSEL slowed down in a 
most typical fashion. He further stated affirmatively that Mr. 
NOVOSEL drove in a proper and reasonable fashion, stayed within 
his lane, and the only reason he was stopped was because there 
was a roadblock. Deputy Sheriff Beeder, who also testified at 
defendant's previous Motion to Suppress, stated that Mr. NOVOSEL 
was further detained after the initial stop for approximately 
seven (7) minutes and was required to perform a field sobriety 
test. Deputy Sheriff Beeder states that he did not observe the 
NOVOSEL vehicle as it approached the roadblock. Deputy Sheriff 
Beeder testified that Sergeant Tracy asked him to assist on 
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NOVOSEL when Sergeant Tracy stated, "Would you come over and 
assist with this subject and do some field tests? I can tell 
hefs been drinking. I can smell it, and would you do field 
tests.11 In the police report attached hereto as Exhibit "A", 
defendant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL!s breath is described by Officer 
Beeder as mild. It is also noted that Mr. NOVOSEL was 
communicative when the officer noted very talkative in the DUI 
report form. There was nothing in the report to indicate that 
Mr. NOVOSEL1s speech was anything but normal. At the time of the 
stop, defendant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL was seated in his vehicle. 
Defendant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL was, at that time, compelled to 
submit to the officers' presence and was not free to leave until 
the officers1 investigation^and interrogation were completed. 
Clearly defendant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL was seized within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
within the meaning of Article I, Section 14, of the Utah 
Constitution, and his freedom to leave the scene was restrained. 
In the Gibbons matter cited earlier, the facts reveal 
that there the officer had personal observation of the vehicle 
bearing out-of-state license plates which was patrolling the back 
streets, which appeared to be confused or unfamiliar with the 
city. The officer in Gibbons felt that there might be something 
wrong at the late hour of the occurrence. Gibbons,^at 562. 
In Gibbons, as in the present case, the defendant had 
violated no traffic laws in the presence of the officer. In the 
pffesent case, there is no law against drinking and driving; 
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therefore, the mere presence of' an odor of alcohol described as 
mild in this case along with observation of red eyes, standing 
alone, would not form a sufficient basis for continued detention 
and seizure of the defendant and the requiring of the performance 
of field sobriety tests * by the defendant. The officer in 
Gibbons, as in the case at hand, had no reasonable suspicion of a 
connection between the defendant and an unlawful activity. 
In State v. Kimmel, the court held in a similar 
situation: 
. that the objective facts known to the officer 
were not sufficient to form a "reasonable suspicion" 
that the defendant was driving while intoxicated, and 
thus the investigatory stop was not justified. State 
v. Kimmel, 728 P 2d, 894 (Or. 1986). 
The facts in Kimmel reveal an unusual driving pattern when 
defendant failed to hit his brakes or otherwise react to a 
pedestrian that walked near defendant's path of travel. The 
officer in Kimmel pulled alongside defendant's vehicle and noted 
that defendant had a flushed face and watery eyes. On that 
basis, the officer suspected defendant was under the influence of 
intoxicants and stopped him. The Kimmel court recognized the 
rule that: 
In reviewing the reasonableness of a stop, we must 
d e t e r m i n e whether t he s t a n d a r d of a r e a s o n a b l e 
s u s p i c i o n has been met by the ob jec t ive t e s t of 
observable facts known to the officer at the time of 
the s top. Id, at 895. 
The c o u r t went on to s t a t e , " . . . an o f f i c e r ' s 
i n s t i n c t and e x p e r i e n c e cannot form the e n t i r e bas i s for 
reasonable suspicion." Id, at 896. The Kimmel court then held 
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that the facts were insufficient for the officer to form a 
reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving while intox-
icated, and that the evidence available to the officer was 
inconclusive at best. 
In the case at bar, defendant NOVOSEL exhibited no 
suspicious driving pattern and, in fact, according to the 
officers drove in a lawful and normal manner. The mere smell of 
a mild odor of alcohol and reddened eyes is, at best, incon-
clusive and would clearly not form a reasonable suspicion that 
defendant was intoxicated. The further detention of defendant 
and requiring defendant to perform field sobriety tests was 
unlawful and violative of both the federal and Utah Constitutions 
and as such all evidence of the field tests and evidence obtained 
thereafter must be suppressed. 
*
n
 Terry, the court held: 
The exclusionary rule was adopted to effectuate the 
Fourth Amendment right of all citizens to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
"unreasonable searches and seizures" . ... Under 
this rule, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding 
against the victim of the illegal search and 
seizure . . . . The rule's prime purpose is to deter 
future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate 
the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreason-
able searches and seizures . . . . ^United States xr. 
^Pavelski. 789 F. 2dr 485, at 488 (1986) 
gRgsn^^tfr^ki ^  the court pointed out that>^JlAn 
^investigating officer!s subjective good faith, inarticulate 
hunches, and indioa-te and unparticularized suspicion may not~ form 
the basis for an investigatory stop,-" Pavelski at 489. 
In the present case, as stated, the officers1 hunch or 
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suspicion that defendant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL might have been 
driving under the influence of alcohol would still fail to 
support a continued detention of defendant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL1s 
vehicle since the officers had not observed criminal activity, 
and that any hunch of criminal activity was unsupported by the 
facts surrounding this detention. Defendant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL 
drove his car according to law, did not exhibit signs of an 
intoxicated person, but simply had a mild odor of alcohol which 
would not support the continued detention and seizure of this 
defendant• 
III. 
THERE DID NOT EXIST PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST 
DEFENDANT JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL; AND THEREFORE, 
ALL EVIDENCE RECEIVED AFTER THE ARREST MUST BE SUPPRESSED. 
Following the field tests performed by defendant JOSEPH 
A. NOVOSEL, there did not exist sufficient probable cause to 
believe defendant NOVOSEL was intoxicated; and as such, the 
arrest was unlawful. Defendant NOVOSEL was required and 
compelled to take three (3) field sobriety tests on a public road 
in the presence of numerous police officers present at the road 
block. The first test was the Gaze Nystagmus test which we have 
questioned as to its reliability in a separate motion before this 
court. The following tests were a hand-slap and heel-to-toe 
test. Neither of the two tests given would give probable cause 
to arrest Mr. NOVOSEL. The hand-slap test is not one found in 
the Post Standardized Field Sobriety Testing manual; however, the 
heel-to-toe test is one taught by Post. The heel-to-toe test, in 
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fact, demonstrates that Mr. NOVOSEL was not intoxicated since Mr. 
NOVOSEL passed that test according to the Post manual. (Cover 
page and page 40 of the Post Standardized Field Sobriety Testing 
manual is attached hereto as Exhibit "B".) Furthermore, even if 
probable cause was found to arrest Mr. NOVOSEL, the chemical test 
performed "on Mr. NOVOSEL was in violation of statute since the 
admonition concerning the consequences of taking the chemical 
test were not explained to Mr. NOVOSEL. (See police report, X, 
of Exhibit "A" previously attached hereto.) 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The justification for a seizure of the defendant has 
not been met in this case. Conversely, the officers involved 
had made no personal observations of criminal activity as 
concerns defendant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL. Neither of the officers 
had not observed any traffic violations committed by defendant 
JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL. The sole basis for the stop was the road-
block previously questioned by this defendant and the sole basis 
for the continued detention and seizure of defendant JOSEPH A. 
NOVOSEL is that the officers claimed to have smelled a mild odor 
of alcohol on defendant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL. There was not a 
sufficient basis to reasonably suspect defendant JOSEPH A. 
NOVOSEL had violated the DUI statute in Utah. As stated, in all 
other respects Mr. NOVOSEL properly operated his vehicle and 
properly conducted himself at all times. 
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Officer Beeder did not have, according to law, a 
reasonable suspicion that defendant NOVOSEL was intoxicated; and 
therefore, the further detention of Mr. NOVOSEL and requirement 
to perform field sobriety tests were unlawful and violative of 
both the Utah and Federal Constitutions. 
Furthermore, the officer did not have probable cause 
following the field sobriety tests to believe defendant NOVOSEL 
was intoxicated; and therefore, the arrest was unlawful and all 
evidence obtained thereafter must be suppressed. 
Additionally, the chemical test given to defendant 
NOVOSEL was in violation of statute since the admonition 
concerning the chemical tests and its results was not read to 
defendant NOVOSEL by Officer Beeder. 
Based upon the case law authority, facts and oral 
argument at time of the hearing, we hereby respectfully move this 
Honorable Court to suppress all of the evidence that was obtained 
as a result of the unjustified continued seizure and detention of 
defendant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /0**day of February, 1989. 
MifCHEL ZAGEJ^/ S / *-
Attorney at Law 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the /& ^ day of February, 1989, I 
mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
to Sherrie Ragan, Utah County Prosecutor, 37 East Center, Suite 
200, Provo, Utah 84601. 
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V JMMONS AN SU  D CITATION STATE OF UTAH 
t COUNTY OF UTPr}\ 
1 CITY OF 
THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY 
GIVEN NOTICE TO APPEAR IN: 
»URT OF 
OCATED AT ID S. loae-
peeves/Mr rtJZtiof 
<-(.TbH 
tot less than (5) nor more than (14) days after issuance 
Df this citation 
FOR COURT USE ONLY 
DATE OF CONVICTION 
FINE 
JAIL. 
-SUSPENDED. 
.SUSPENDED, 
DISPOSITION 
D Plea Guilty D No Contest 
D Trial Guilty D Not Guilty 
Final Charge 
Prosecuting Agency . 
ISSUING 
ENFORCEMENT 
AGENCY 
NAME 
AOORESS 
(Last) 
UY- CJZ Jft&Zrt, 
(First) 
CASE i r y -
NO 
C I T A T I U N INU 
D 08183, 
m. 
-{Middle) 
A-
Oliver License No 
223d££L 
57 4 Apfr/yns 
H*ght, S~9 
License Class 
A 
"(Ciiyj ' (Slate) 
^ni i Off At £ QiT 
Weight 
Vehicle Make 
CH&j-
Eyes 
Vehicle Type 
T Expires 
Sex 
State Restriction Code 
Z-euS 
Vehicle Year 
67, 
Vehicle License No 
Color 
£ei) 
0O8 \ 
1-2I-S7\ 
Zip 
SVeuH 
Motorcycle 
Yes (No) 
State 
uT 
Expires 
Accident 
Yes -g£> 
Oirection of Travel 
N ££> E W 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING 
^ U T A H CODE D COUNTY CODE D CITY CODE NO . *-/J md>* VQ 4* 
ON THE / DAY OF fi-UG- 19 P? MILITARY TIME / &£?> 
LOCATION . 5 £ & f &%6Q/v 
VIOLATION(S) Pu f ALCOHOL. 
. MILE POST NO 
WITHOUT ADMIT^NG GUILT I PROMISE TO APPEAR AS DIRECTED HEREIN 
SIGNATURE _ 
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THIS SUMMONS AND CITATION WAS DULY SERVED UPON THE DEFENDANT 
ACCORDING TO U W ON THE ABOVE DATE AND I KNOW OR BELIEVE AND SO ALLEGE THAT THE ABOVE 
NAMED DEFENDANT DID COMMIT THE OFFENSE HEREIN SET FORTH CONTRARY TO LAW I FURTHER CER-
TIFY THAT THE COURT TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO APPEAR IS THE PROPER 
COURT PURSUANT TO SECTION 77-7-19, UCA 
OFFICER 
COMPLAINANT 
.BADGE NO 
DATE OF CITATION 
OLD 
COURT COPY ONE 
DATE SENT TO OLD DOCKET NO 
EXHIBIT "A,f 
SOMPLAIfT "PORT UTAH COUNTY SHRRIFF DEPT. 
TAKEN BY imq HOW PHONS RAO* PERSON §11 -REPORTED \y^ Q O a N2^57218 
TIME RECDi mo PERSON REI nmriif. AOORESS TELEPHONE 
TIME OtSP. VICTIM AOORESS TELEPHONE 
•^PrfoB ?r t i7Hp<^1& qnrSfsffifiEOft/ TIME ARRVD LOCATION OF INCIDENT 
€± i 
TIME COMPLETED DISPATCHER nrg OFFICER ASSIGNED \-Keer\p, 
Jp^Ph h Ncwnse.l OETAJLS: UJA1 
I 
0> ^ 
Ll&fe-
REPORT OF OFFICER S FINDINGS: _ 
T^tVCvj 
Pfrft&s. \\er t o t e rb> ftrtuwn O/Vi S p . A l - f/>tn./i «SA»U^ ( . QLC e/t*o 
^ N ^ flflpfrrk -Ti2fl.cy p i n inAnnuivfi* 
frothy tt£r> *Vt> r>fl.\rt^K>c efyu,\6{t 
OFFICER C-J^PL. TIME . COMPLETED 0550 f X M . . Q P.M. DATE . 
~~!AUG im 
S-3-f»7 
USE OTHER SIDE F MORE SPACE NEEDED 
$$* m 
FORM KUO RCV. 9 1 2 
/ • - • - • • • • l - -
oncmM • rotwAto NMMOIATIIY TO T M MOTOR VCUKU DIVISION or nw STATI TAX COMMISSION 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH 
VEHICLE I M P O U N D REffORT 
VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION 
OR SERIAL NUMBER 
REPORT 12 05 03 
DA,E 0T-OI-S7 Sff STYLE 
YEAR OF L I C 
YEAR 
If-ft?™* UfAff- NO UL-2J8& 
A NO.233610 i 
LICENSE 
.TAB . NO. a/DV99 
YARD 
NO. 
OF T A B - _ VEHICLE REMOVED F R O M . 
STORED AT ADDRESS 
REASON 
FOR 
I M P O U N D 
| IMPROPER REGIS IRA I ION INO UIAH REGISTRAIION EXPIRED RtGlSIRAlION THEFT ^ OUI ABANDONED 
POSSIBLE THEFT 
OfHER 
SEE 
REMARKS 
OWNER 
VEHICLE 
DRIVER ADDRESS 
ACCESSORIES Rltf \A .- RADIO I SPOT UGH I HUB CAPS ERRORS \ ^ JX 13 (fo^'*D HEA1ER m 01 HER SEE REMARKS * * - * ~ - | | S~7*** I r ^ X r-*^ _P I V < ^ * > I  | I 
DAMAGE ^ / ^ c J b ^ My*sr.^&*p*jGZ ftprJnt) c^Vad Atntebm \ 
TXTrfrrCy'
 Ar,Mrv (Ar.CjQ. I I 
PROPERTY 
IN VEHICLE 
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE. 
REMARKS 
USE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS COPY FOR OFFICERS PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION REPORT. 
UTAH DANK NOTE CO. 801/3221071 
DUI 
UMMONS AND CITATION 
STATE OF UTAH 
(COUNTY OF UTfr}} 
CITY OF 
THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY 
GIVEN NOTICE TO APPEAR IN: 
JRTOF 
-JZenQ^ O/O 
ISSUING 
ENFORCEMENT 
AGENCY 
NAME 
UT. ra- sH-e£)FF 
(Last) 
AObfiESS (Cittf 
57 <? AOfi/MfS 
(First) 
CASE S - 7 -
NO. 
CITATION NO. 
D 08183 
Middle) A" 
Driver License No. License Class 
Height. 
Vehicle Make 
eu. 
Weight 
Clji 
Eyes 
MUZ. 
Vehicle Type 
(State) 
Expires 
Sex 
State 
UT. 
Restriction Code 
Vehicle Year 
Vehicle License No. 
LL- 3/gfr 
G1 
Color 
£ML 
DOB 
zip 7-3MT 
2</0Qti 
Motorcycle 
Yes (Go) 
State 
U T 
Expires 
Acadent 
Yes - © IDirection of Travel N £pE W 
SATED AT T Q 3 - I04&-
pLgy^/M/T tiJliwr 
itT/M 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING: % 
^3-UTAH CODE • COUNTY CODE D CITY CODE NO.: ^ ^ ^ H 
ON THE / DAY OF A-UG'« 19 9? MILITARY TIME / & 3 3 
LOCATION . 3£&r &$6o/v. 
I less than (5) nor more than (14) days after issuance 
his citation. VIOLATION(S): Du f ALCOHOL. 
. MILE POST NO. 
FOR COURT USE ONLY 
ITE OF CONVICTION 
^E .SUSPENDED 
WITHOUT ADMITTING GUILT I PROMISE TO APPEAR AS DIRECTED HEREIN 
SIGNATURE 
iL . SUSPENDED 
SPOSITION * 
Plea Guilty D No Contest 
Trial Guilty G Not Guilty 
nal Charge 
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THIS SUMMONS AND CITATION WAS DULY SERVED UPON THE DEFENDANT 
ACCORDING TO LAW ON THE ABOVE DATE AND I KNOW OR BELIEVE AND SO ALLEGE THAT THE ABOVE 
NAMED DEFENDANT DIO COMMIT THE OFFENSE HEREIN SET FORTH CONTRARY TO LAW. I FURTHER CER-
TIFY THAT THE COURT TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO APPEAR IS THE PROPER 
COURT PURSUANT TO SECTION 77-7-19. U OA. 
rosecuting Agency. 
OFFICER 
COMPLAINANT 
.BADGE NO. 
DATE OF OIATION 
lit 
(STATIC h. 
LD 
COURT COPY ONE 
DATE SENT TO OLD DOCKET NO. 
READ CAREFULLY 
This citation is not an information and will not be used as an information without your consent If an information is 
filed you will be provided a copy by the court You MUST appear in court on or before the time set in this citation. 
IF YOU FAIL TO APPEAR AN INFORMATION WILL BE FILED AND THE COURT MAY ISSUE A WARRANT FOR 
YOUR ARREST. 
NOTICE OF INTEtfT TO SUSPEND OR REVOKE: You are hereby notified that thirty-one (31) days from the date of 
this notice your privilege to operate motor vehicles in the State of Utah will be suspended pursuant to Section 41-2-19.6 
UCA for a period of ninety (90) days thereafter, or for a period of one hundred twenty (120) days if this is the second 
or subsequent occurrence of this offense OR if a peace officer has indicated you have refused to submit to a 
chemical test to determine the alcohol or drug content of your breath, blood or urine, you are hereby notified 
that thirty-one (31) days from the date of this notice your privilege to operate motor vehicles in the State of 
Utah will be revoked pursuant to 41-6-44-10 UCA for a period of one (1) year. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO RE-
QUEST A HEARING ON THIS SUSPENSION OR REVOCATION. The hearing is not for purposes of granting you 
a limited license but only to determine whether or not your license should be suspended or revoked. 
The department will NOT contact you further regarding a hearing unless you request a hearing in writing. Your WRIT-
TEN REQUEST must be sent WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS of the date of arrest to the DRIVER UCENSE DIVISION at 
4501 South 2700 West, P.O. Box 30560, Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0560. Upon your timely written request for a 
hearing you will be notified of a time and place to appear. If you fail to appear or request a hearing, your driver license 
suspension or revocation will become effective as indicated above. The administrative hearing is civil in nature and 
does not satisfy the requirement for you to appear in court. 
DUI REPORT FORM 
• •• -""•»*->|D?,0 8 1 8 3 
• • * •••• • '.'.I.' ci'"!.:1- 3'5«"I»MV;'?I 
.I ._ I "-.• ..-.i'.;.:p' \:«r;t { i . ' w n s vi. 
/. CASE IDENTIFICATION: *1~ 
Data f - t ' ? * l Day SfirT- Ar.cAdent A/ 0 Cnse # £ 7 . 3 / 6 Tima Prepared 
Subject's Name Tc&epi). A /Voun.trL- Address 57? A/PAntiS in/nvrtie ura.li 
Place of Emploftnftnt ^/Z/wrr<- -SCHOOL Address ' " 
Home Telephone Number 5"6/- 7*7*7/ Work Telephone Number Z_. 
D.O.B. 1-2*1" 5" 1 Driver License f Zp-Stosi : Time of Arrest lMr-.^ ' 
Place of Arrest L&rti atniy • Charges Q u i ^ •'••^: 
Arresting Officer <* fitaJltAS • • Assisting Officers ' - ' - - i ':,TVCM v c \ r -
Arresting Agency U £Sa 
II. VEHICLE
 w - • • -
Year <W Color JLSf? Make ^V-fgV. _ Model \ 7/ZuctL-
License # and state UTA^. <1£ ?,/?&> Disposition ltt,)&{). -Ve/bbS* 
Registered Owner <Tog^?tf- NOI)OS&L. Address ^/9-rr^ -e * 
III. WITNESSES: (If passengers, indicate specifically) ':* ' !'" :' ""' •' ' " r ' ' ' ' • Ai"';t"r'"'"' 
Name Address Tele. # :'-'"' "' "' ' : """ Age/DOB'' 
1. 0". T(l(W tiCSo- * . 
• ' • • • ' '••»• • . ; • ' • • ' ' • •• .'.-.r-. I'-::T ,\.'•? Vi'tii'itF 
2. 
1 
4. '.';., J '. '• V \* 
•i . . • • . ; . . .... ...; . . , *..«•, .r t.Via i-; en i 
& . "~" * ~ ~ ~ " — ' 
IV. ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL: • : • ' • ; 
The facts establishing the subject's actual physical control of a motor vehicle are: f/»A-^ #6%ifV/7 
V. DRIVINd PATTERN: ' ' *'
 % , .
 v
.
 C! ,C
 ". _ ,_ 
Subject's location when first observed At " SfL &g : (±%oo A3. * 
— The facts observed regarding driving pattern: STcp/p&p on fcofip BLQCML <£>/V 6& /^g« 
OWL*] PgfLCf/u Ito Qg-\4^CL^ A T H ^ i ^ ^ . ' t e P ^ T O P " - - • 
^ * ~ ~ *— ** #-
t 
• . . * i . . i i i 1 1 * > • i . i . 1 . , . 
: ~ . — u _ . — : Z 
VI. PRE-ARREST STATEMENTS OF SUBJECT: 
VII. PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS:' • ^ 
Odor of alcoholic hevftrann '•' *SMIx.O ''AuT Pt^t)/ /V6Ti<zA&L<b^ v-"'t"c*- > .r 
Speech UKTt^f TtK)£A.T'0 G • / 
BalanrB' ' ' ' fttoA • ' ' - ' • ; - ^ 
Signs'* or complaints Df injury' or i l l n e s s " " '/OpytiL?^ ^ ' - ^ • • ^ V . A - . K . ).Vx tx<K- v.cs^ » 
'Other physical characteristics ACo^/7 b-ffoT E)/(sr± 
SOBRIETY TESTS: (Desc" <* subject's actions) 
flrC 45° A/vdiL& r^r'P Birr-oHis. UNS^6QTY\ PUILSUI'T^ 
MfinJQ S i / M l - £ g / g g 7 r a r f ) O/O -Sc jy f i / v£ . ST#rZT<?/? *OetZ- Tlt?iC&. SccaJ^O 
a 
4. Ae&L To -roe'~ 5LUA\/I=:0 **>x US/*L/£//O<S- /£Ais&rfK*rtrt-w05 s/v<~e- 7-0 
5. 
Were tests demonstrated by officer? \j&S - Subject's ability to follow instructions, 
IX. SEARCHES 
A, Vehicle: 
Was subject's vehicle searched? Vg5 Where? <Sce7u-** 
When? Aj£jU*X Evidence ^ ^ 7 ^ -
Person who performed the search ^ - T/gfl*V 
B. Subject: 
Was subject's person searched? Y&&- Where? % v'' $Cbn*4-
When? MM^Jr Evidence Found ^ r a -
Person who performed the search <" fksuJh^ 
CHEMICAL TESTS: 
Mr. or Mrs. IUPVQS>S^ -
 % d 0 y o u understand that you are under arrest for 
driving under the influence of alcohol (drugs)? Response, (if any) ' 
I hereby request that you submit to a chemical test io determine the alcohol (drug) content of your blood. I 
request that you take a f^\JLattk . test. 
(bIood(6re^urine) 
• The following admonition was^aiven bv me to the subject before the chemical test was adminis-
tered: " ' ' }' 
Results indicating .08% or more by weight of alcohol in your blood shall, and the existence of a blood 
alcohol content or presence of drugs sufficient to render you incapable of safely driving a vehicle may, 
result in suspension or revocation of your license or privilege to operate, a motorryehicla 
What is your response to my request that you submit to a chemical test? Response: y ^z^3^ 
Did subject submit to a chemical test? Y g & ' Type of test f/UT0</Li2&/Z 
Test Administered by C fiyU^oL Where? * A-Ffjff * 
Time: « l^t^T Results • 11 ^ Was.subject notified of results? \ • V 
Serial No. of test machine: aq^ooi/37 
.
 % (if the subject refuses the test, read the following) » 
• The following admonition was given by me to the subject: 
If you refuse the test, it will not be given, however I must warn you that if you refuse, your license or 
permit to drive a motor vehicle may be revoked for one year with no provision for a limited driver's license. 
After you have taken this test, you will be permitted to have a physician of your own choice administer 
a test at your own expense, in addition to the one I have requested you to submit to, so long as it does, 
not delay the test or tests requested by me. Upon your request, I will make available to you the results 
of the test if you take it. 
(if the subject claims th <ght to remain silent or the right to co $e\, read the following:) * 
3 The following admonition was given by me to the subject: 
Your right to remain silent and your right to counsel do not apply to the implied consent law which 
is civil in nature and separate from the criminal charges. Your right to remain silent does not give you 
the right to refuse to take the test. You do not have the right to have counsel during the test procedure. 
Unless you submit to the test I am requesting, I will consider that you have refused to take the test. 
I warn you that if you refuse to take the test, your driver'% license can be revoked for one year with 
no provision for a limited license. 
XI. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: 
Was subject advised of the following rights? ysS» When APT&L tt>n-o+. T V ^ T * 
By Whom? ? C (hjuiAjL^ Where? A Pf 0. 
(S 1. You have the right to remain silent.
 m 
*S 2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. 
<S 3. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while you are being ques-
tioned. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to .representfyou before 
any questioning, if you wish one. • • h 
y 4. If you decide to answer questions now without having counsel present, you may stop answer-
ing questions at any time. Also, you may request counsel at any time during questioning. 
Were the following waiver questions asked? 5JL 
/ 
1. Do you understand each of these rights I have explained to you? 
Response V F S -
2. JHaving these rights in mind, do you wish fo talk to us now? 
Response y ^ ^ • 
INTERVIEW: . , , _ 
Were you operating a vehicle? \/g"^> 4- LuflS 
Where were you going? <?1TV/Ler / AJ C&tf-i ryVl&V&THC^— 
What street or highway were you on? K£Q UJ60O (LOftrO 
Direction of travel? NQfcTH-
Where did you start from? Dffl-T (lofr/O a rv fat-rXjfO* 
When? What time is it now? f?',3(* 
What is today's date? /? HC » I - £ 7 Day of week? 
(Actual time Date Day S&T 
What city or county are you in now? ^ o ^ tfft£» f^ftp^-** 
What were you doing duringHhe last three hours? fLfVp/vG C U » T H . hC/iO?, 
A. /3erv>i- OF) a . 
_L T 
Have you been drinking? s!L-
What? fieVTl— ' How much? Q> PfiCML. 
Where? SfrnO Qdf&£> • y ; 
When did you have your first drink? f,o& .Last drink? /4ouH- A6-o 
Are you under the influence of an alcoholic beverage (drugs) now? pty^u'T F^ei u&tr <T-
Are you taking tranquilizers, pills, medicines or drugs of any kind? A5p/7Z//° * 
(What kind? Get sample) ZZ f 
When did you have the last dose? 
Are you ill? 
(If subject was in an accident, ask these questions:) 
Were you involved in an accident today? ^ 0 
Have you had any alcoholic beverage or drugs since the accident? 
If so, what? ~ When? 
6THER OCCURRENCES OR FACTS: 
XIII. ATTACHED DOCUMENTS: 
I have attached the following documents to this report: 
1. 0 Copy of citation/temporary license / V O T O/M \^inv\ 
2. • Subject's Utah driver's license or driver's permit •? 
3. D Traffic accident report 
4. D Other documents (specify) 
I hereby certify that I am a sworn Utah Peace Officer and that the information contained above in this report form and attached 
documents is true and correct to my knowledge and belief and that this report form was prepared in the regular course of my 
duties. It is my belief the subject was in violation of section 41-6-44 U.C.A. at the date, time, and place specified in this report. 
CPfogJlu; 
Signature of Peace Officer 
Law Enforcement Agency: &T- Cn. $ffis€.iFFz 
nate- > - 3 ' * 7 ' Time: Q42-I 
The original of this form must be sent within five (5) days of the arrest of the subject to: 
Driver License Division • 
4501 South 2700 West 
P.O. Box 30560 
Salt Like City, Utah 84130-0560 
*-/-*? 
DATE 
3-7- S7*i9> 
CASE NUMBER APPROVED 
NAME OF DEFENDANT: 
ADDRESS OF DEFENDANT: 
DATE OF BIRTH: 
OFFENSE(S): Q 
iDSerptf- A • 
' 1 
1'dU'St 
(A i AiCOI-lOL. 
• /VO(/oSe~L-
/YY) 1 DO ALB um. S-yo)l 
t/i-L'Mi 
ALCOHOL TEST RESULTS - BREATH:_ 
TYPE OF VEHICLE: . C Uer// • 
in BLOOD: 
TlPMCkL SPEED: 
LOCATION OF INCIDENT: £ fZ. £ 8 hZoo A? 
DATE OF OFFENSE: AU.C f- 9 7 
C P fl?g??ft7l ARRESTING OFFICER/COMPLAINANT: 
AGENCY/ADDRESS: U C- S O 
COURT: p P T R a C < f t U f LmZftlVT 6-/lO V<= 
VICTIM: 
VICTIM'S ADDRESS: 
WITNESSES: 
1. 
2. 
3 . 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
Name 
SUMMONS? Y e s . 
Address 
UCSD 
No. 
ZT- -W-$C\J UCSd 
I C E USE ONLY 
, CHECKED 
J COMPUTER 
PRINTOUT 
,—, WITNESSES J—J 
I 1 NAMES 6 I I 
ADDRESS 
FORM i D D P. CAUSE AFFIDAVIT 
FILLED OUT 
BY OFFICER 
(if applicablej 
P,T, or*r, 
Burroughs ^ f ^ N ^ w 
...C v_..w... D. 
CMI INCORPORATED 
r- r 
.-/ -
. 1 — j' i -.-
INTOXILYZER 
OPERATIONAL CHECKLIST - D (ASA) 
INTOXILYZER TEST RECORD 
SUBJECT JgS^fH-10oO&fgt. DATE $-1-81 TIME / g a g _ 
INSTRUMENT » cm~6s\\?>'7 LOCATION A P / 7 ? 
OPERATOR C &ej&£L>^ 
xh i. 
V$ 2. 
^ " 5. 
fcA- 6. 
POWER SWITCH ON, READY LIGH^ON. 
CONNECT BREATH TUBE TO PUMP TUBE. INSERT TEST RECORD 
CARD. 
PRESS ADVANCE, WAIT FOR LIGHT 2, 
PRESS ^ ADVANCE, WAIT FOR LIGHT 3. 
DISCONNECT PUMP TUBE FROM BREATH TUBE]* EXTEND BREATH 
TUBE AND INSERT MOUTHPIECE. - TAKE BREATH*SAMPLE. 
(NOTE TIME) LIGHT 4 WILL COME ON AFTER SAMPLE IS 
TAKEN, (heSciLTS- *H1 
REMOVE MOUTHPIECE, HCUSE BREATH TUBE AND CONNECT TO 
PUMP TUBE, PRESS ADVANCE WAIT FOR LIGHT 5. REMOVE TEST 
RECORD CARD. 
POWER SWITCH OFF. 
X ALCOHOL IN tLOOO 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
A* 0 D 
• 
3 i i 
A* 0 0 
• 
INTOXILYZER PRINT CODE 
A - A I R BLANK 
B - BREATH 
C - CALIBRATORCSimulator) 
OBSERVED SUBJECT 
FOR REQUIRED OBSERVATION 
PERIOD AND FOLLOWED 
CHECK LIST 
OPERATOR'S INITIAL, 
P-rfD-INTOXILYZER LOCATION 
<?^-0OM37 
INTOXILYZER SERIAL NUMBER 
DATE 
I ^ 
SUBJECTS N A M J L _ j j m n 
lfJiT 
TIME riRST OBSERVEO 
•Hos 
TIME TEST STARTED, 
OPERATOR 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND/OR REMARKS 
HPT-I8 (P-732) 
STANDARDIZED FIELD 
SQ3RIETY TESTING 
STUDENT MANUAL 
5 f\T7\ fl 
UTAH HIGHWAY PATROL 
POST 
EXHIBIT "B" 
As the suspect performs the 
var ious^tests , th is portion of 
the f i e l d note taking guide rnay 
be used to keep score by placing 
a n*rk rext to the part of the 
tes t the subject f a i l e d tc do 
adequately. I t would then be 
put with your other r.ot2S for 
future reference. 
WALK AND TURN 7HS7 
CAN'T KEEP 8ALANCE WHILE LISTEN-
ING TO INSTRUCTING. 
STARTS BEFORE INSTRUCTIONS 
FINISHED. 
STOPS WALKING TO STEADY SELF. 
DOES NOT TOUCH HEEL TO IGS. 
LOSES BALANCE WHILE WALING 
(STEPS OFF THE L\z 
USES ARMS FOR SALAnCE (?MSzS 
ARMS MORE THAN SIX INCHES.) 
LOSES SAIAHCE WHILE TURNING. 
TURNS INCORRECTLY. 
.NCC = REC7 NUMBER OF STEPS. 
CANNOT CO TEST [ S ^ S OFF UNE 2 
3R VQ->.zT:VzSy 
TOTAL SCORE JCECSICN K v " Z, 
DOB DATS 
OTHER 7ES~S: 
40 
MOTION IN LIMINE 
Case No. 1-7437-87 
MITCHEL ZAGER - 3968 
Attorney for Defendant 
3167 West 4700 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118 
Telephone (801) 964-6100 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT - AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL, 
Defendant. 
ooOoo 
COMES NOW Mitchel Zager, Attorney for defendant, JOSEPH 
A. NOVOSEL, and hereby moves this Honorable Court to suppress all 
mention and results of the GAZE NYSTAGMUS test performed on 
defendant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL at the tim& of the field sobriety 
test. 
I. 
THE HORIZONTAL,GAZE NYSTAGMUS TEST IS VIOLATIVE OF DUE 
PROCESS AND MUST BE SUPPRESSED. 
In People v. Vega, the court held that it should be 
reversible error for the "trial court to permit testimony from 
the officer that befsed upon the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus 
test, a person had a blood alcohol concentration of .1 % or 
more. To allow such testimony will raise a number of due 
EXHIBIT "D' 
process problems, since the arresting officer!s reading of 
the test results cannot be verified or duplicated by an inde-
pendent party. People v. Vega, 496 N.E. (P 2d) 501 (1986). 
The court went on to state: 
Moreover, because the test has a wide margin of error, 
it cannot begin to satisfy a conscientious court that 
testimony as to the test results are sufficiently 
probative so as to overcome the obvious prejudicial 
impact of such evidence. Relatively more accurate 
chemical testing devices are readily available, and 
should be preferred when compared to the dubious 
Horizontal Gaze* Nvstaamus field test. 
II. 
GAZE NYSTAGMUS TEST IS NOT SCIENTIFICALLY ACCEPTABLE 
AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED INTO EVIDENCE 
SAT TIME OF TRIAL. 
The NHTSA researchers found that 50-60* of normal 
individuals will exhibit nystagmus when the eyes are deviated 
to the lateral extreme, when in fact no alcohol consumption 
has taken place. Toqlia Electronystagmography: Technical 
Aspects and Atlas, (1976). 
III. 
GAZE NYSTAGMUS TESTS SHOULD NOT BE ADMITTED INTO 
EVIDENCE SINCE DEPUTY Beeder IS NOT AN EXPERT 
IN NYSTAGMUS. 
When questioned about Gaze Nystagmus, Officer Beeder 
was unfamiliar with the various factors that can cause 
nystagmus. This precludes defendant from effective cross-
examination since Officer Beeder can merely testify as to his 
opinion as to the correlation between what he alleaes he 
observed and the result that defendant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL 
demonstrated alcohol consumption which put his blood alcohol 
at a .10 * alcohol. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
There are several arguments which dictate against 
permitting the Gaze Nystagmus Test to be admitted into 
evidence. The test is one that is not accepted in the 
scientific community and is subject to many variables some of 
which will indicate alcohol consumption and some of which 
won't. The test is, therefore, not reliable, and its 
prejudicial effect far outweighs its probative value. 
Secondly, the officer who conducted the Gaze 
Nystagmus Test is not qualified nor an expert in the 
scientific procedure and is unfamiliar with various variables 
that will affect the jlest, some of which have nothing to do 
with the consumption of alcohol. The defendant is deprived 
of his due process in cross-examining this witness since the 
witness can only testify as to his opinion as to the result 
and is not an expert and cannot testify as to the various 
factors which affect nystagmus. 
Furthermore, defendant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL $s deprived 
of due process because the test results cannot be verified or 
duplicated by an independent party. 
Based upon the case law authority, facts and oral 
3 
argument at time of the hearing, we hereby respectfully move 
this Honorable Court to suppress all of the evidence of the 
Gaze Nystagmus Test. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this JD ^ day of February, 
1989. 
/5feS icJt, 
MITCHEL ZAGE& 
Attorney at Law 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the /£)r" day of February, 1989, I 
mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the 
foregc^ng to Sherrie Ragan, Utah County Prosecutor, 37 East 
Center, Suite 200, Provo, Utah 84601. 
'^z^dU /STILCM^ 
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STEVEN B. KILLPACK 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
37 East Center St., Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801) 373-0136 
IN THE FIRST PRECINCT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
REPLY TO SECOND 
Plaintiff, : REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
vs. 
JOSPEH A. NOVOSEL, Case No. 1-7437-87 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW plaintiff, State of Utah, by and through its 
attorney, Carlyle K. Bryson, and in answer to defendant's Second 
Request For Discovery provides the following information: 
1. The exact time the roadblock was established and 
dismantled are not matters of record with the Utah County 
Sheriff's Office. 
2. The names of all officers attending the roadblock are 
not matters of record with the Utah County Sheriff's Office. 
Officers attending a roadblock may change as demands elsewhere 
may require. Total number of officers was never less than 
requred by office policy. See Attachment #1. 
3. No advanced advertisement or media notice was given of 
this roadblock. 
4. The roadblock was located at the intersection of State 
Road 68 and 6800 North in the county area south-west of Lehi, 
Utah. 
EXHIBIT ,,E» 
5. See attachment #1. 
6. See attachment #1. 
7. The number of persons stopped at the roadblock is not a 
matter of record with the Utah County Sheriff's Office. 
8. The number of "DUI" arrests made at the roadblock is not 
a matter of record with the Utah County Sheriff's Office. 
9. The number and nature of other arrests at the roadblock 
are not matters of record with the Utah County Sheriff's Office. 
10. The number and nature of other citations issued at the 
roadblock are not matters of record with the Utah County 
Sheriff's Office. 
11. This question is repetitive of question #18. See 
question #18 answer. 
12. The average length of time each motorist at this 
roadblock was stopped is not a matter of record with the Utah 
County Sheriff's Office. It is estimated that the average length 
of time a motorist is stopped at roadblocks conducted by the Utah 
County Sheriff's Office is between 30 seconds and one minute 
unless a violation is detected. 
13. This question is ambiguous and cannot be answered in its 
present form. 
14. The roadblock was authorized by Lt. David Lamph, Utah 
County Sheriff's Office pursuant to attachment #1. 
15. The purpose of this roadblock was to check for Driver's 
License, Registration and alcohol violations. 
16• Part one of this question related to "a description of 
the number of police vehicles" is ambiguous and cannot be 
answered in its present form. The location of police vehicles at 
the time of the roadblock varied as vehicles arrived and 
departed. 
17. Ail officers attending the roadblock were uniformed 
officers. The total number of officers at the roadblock varied 
depending on various factors. That part of this question related 
to "their positions* is ambiguous and cannot be answered in its 
present form. 
18. Orange reflective signs approximately 16 inches square 
were placed on large highway cones in the middle of the roadway. 
Signs read "Sheriff's Roadblock Ahead" and were placed with 
burning emergency flares. Emergency lights on patrol vehicles 
were left in operation. 
DATED this 7th day of October, 1987. 
KAY B R Y S O N / 7 X 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
STEVEN B. KILLPACK 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
37 East Center St., Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801) 373-0136 
IN THE FIRST PRECINCT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
REPLY TO THIRD 
Plaintiff, : REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
vs. 
JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL, Case No. 1-7437-87 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW plaintiff, State of Utah, by and through its 
attorney, Carlyle K. Bryson, and in answer to defendant's Third 
Request For Discovery provides the following information: 
1. Defendant has previously been provided with a written 
copy of the Utah County Sheriff's policy on roadblocks. Oral 
statements given to each officer attending this roadblock are not 
a matter of record with the Utah County Sheriff's Office. 
2. This question is ambiguous and cannot be answered in its 
present form. 
3. The exact distance between the roadblock and warning 
signs are not a matter of record with the Utah County Sheriff's 
Office. In general, the distance between roadblock and warning 
signs is determined by a number of factors including, time of 
day, speed limit of the highway or roadway, traffic conditions 
and highway or roadway conditions. Roadblocks held in the area 
of this roadblock, as a general rule, have warning signs placed 
D V U T ' O x m It T?*« 
approximately 300 feet from the roadblock and are visible at a 
distance of at least 500 Feet from the roadblock. 
4. No equipment to determine blood alcohol content was 
present at the roadblock, 
5. The Senior officer present at this roadblock was 
Sergeant Kerry Evans. 
6. Defendant's request is too broad and unreasonable. 
DATED this 26th day of October, 1987. 
CARLYLE KAY BRYSON 
Deputy l#ah County Attorney 
UttlfC^ryirA,-/ #-. 
g t Utah County Sheriff 
^iip==£*
 1 7 ? 5 S 0 U T H OAKOTA LANE PROVO. UTAH 84601 PHONE 374-2211 
MACK HOLLEY 
$h*nff 
TO: Patrol Sergeants DATE: October 11, 1984 
FROM: Lt. David Lamph RE: Roadblocks 
Until such time as I am able to develop a more comprehensive 
policy in this matter the following will be used. 
1. The roadblock must be for a specific purpose/ ie. drivers 
license, registration/ alcohol violations,•etc. 
2. The need for the roadblock, if other than license and regis-
tration violations/ should be borne out through the use of 
complaint reports/ extra patrol'requests/ or the deputy?s 
personal knowledge. 
3. The' sergeant on duty must be at the roadblock to supervise-
his deputies actions. 
4. if the sergeant is not on duty his designated senior patrol 
deputy must be at the roadblock. 
5. Deputies do not have the, discretion to establish a non-
emergency roadlbock. - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ » _ _ ^ 
6. There will He no less than three deputies at any non-emsrgen< 
roadblock. This number may include the sergeaiv: or senior . 
_ Patrol deputy. „ 
7. Roadblocks will be held in a safe location/ eg. not a blind 
curve. Drivers of vehicles should be allowed a large amount 
of reaction time and this should be in the deputies view* 
2 
8. The public has a right to travel the highway in safety. 
When the traffic has backed up to be a sufficient irritant 
to the public or a safety hazard you will direct traffic 
through stopping only the obvious violators. 
9. There will be an obvious escape route made at the road-
block in the event a violator "runs" the roadblock. The 
escape route will be in such a location that the deputy 
is not in danger. 
10. Roadblocks should be established where there is enough room 
for the violator to pull off the roadway. 
11. Chase vehicles will be positioned to apprehend those who 
\\ evade the roadblock. 
\^y£Sr N>ofc-r-' Patrol Commander 
^ ' TITLE 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
CARL CRAIG HOLLEY, | 
Defendant. 
i RULING ON MOTION TO 
1 SUPPRESS 
) Case No. 16530 
Having considered the evidence presented at the hearing 
on defendant's motion to suppress and having considered the 
memoranda and authorities presented by both parties, the Court 
rules as follows: 
The issues presented were: 
1. Was the roadblock in question conducted with the 
primary purpose of detecting drinking drivers? 
2. If so, are such roadblocks constitutional? 
I find that the primary purpose of the roadblock in 
question was to detect and apprehend drinking drivers. The facts 
leading to this conclusion are as follows: (1) An intoxilyzer 
machine was present at the scene; (2) A deputy city attorney and 
a deputy county attorney were present at the scene; (3) Several 
cars were at the scene for the designated purpose of transporting 
prisoners; (4) The guidelines used by the law enforcement 
officers were entitled "Roadblock D.D.I. Enforcement". 
EXHIBIT "G" 
s6n Motion to Suppress 
/o. 16530 
In determining whether such roadblocks are legal, it is 
/ecessary to balance the government's law enforcement interests 
against the degrefe of intrusion on an individual's Fourth 
Amendment rights. No authority has been presented on this issue 
which I consider to be directly binding on the courts in Utah. 
Some courts have determined that D.D.I, roadblocks are 
unconstitutional regardless of how they are conducted. State v. 
Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Oklahoma 1984)f People v. Bartley, 446 
N.E.2d 346 (Illinois 1984). 
Other courts have suggested that they possibly may be 
proper under some circumstances but were improperly conducted in 
the instant case. Commonwealth v. McGeochegan, 449 N.E.2d 349 
(Mass. 1983) , State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court of State, 
663 P.2d 992 (Ariz. 1983). 
In State v. Deskins, 673 P.2d il74 (Kan. 1983), the 
court determined that D.U.I, roadblocks were constitutional if 
properly conducted and the court suggested certain guidelines 
that would result in legal roadblocks. 
In reviewing the cases from the various state courts, no 
general rule has emerged. 
It is clear from the evidence presented at the hearing 
that the roadblock in question was professionally and safely 
conducted and that it would have satisfied the basic guidelines 
suggested by the court in the Deskins case. There is also no 
doubt that drunk drivers are a menace to the public. However, 
fq on Motion to Suppress 
4o. 16530 
/ere is a degree of intrusion and fear that individuals are 
''subjected to when passing through roadblocks* Such intrusions 
may be tolerable 'where evidence suggests there are no less 
intrusive but equally effective means of detecting violators, I 
am not persuaded that such less intrusive means do not exist. 
Therefore, I am adopting the reasoning followed by the courts in 
People v. Bartley and State v. Smith in ruling that the roadblock 
in question is unconstitutional. 
DATED this 14th day of March, 1985. 
/s/ David E. Roth 
DAVID E. ROTH, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Ruling on Motion to Suppress to Richard Parmley, 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 7th floor Municipal Building, Ogden, Utah 
84401, and to Christopher Shaw, Attorney for Defendant, 635 25th 
Street, Ogden, Utah 84401, on this 14th day of March, 1985. 
/s/ Paula Carr 
PAULA CARR, Secretary 
MlTCHEL ZAGER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
gFFB^ WEST=2RF€RF5e0TH 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84118 
TELEPHONE ( 8 0 1 ) 9 6 4 - 0 1 0 0 
3587 West 4700 South 
February 28, 1990 
FILED 
MAR 5 1990 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
RE: Citation of Supplemental Authorities 
Pursuant to Rule 24(J) 
State of Utah v. Novosel, Case No. 890143-CA 
Ladies and Gentlemen: 
The following cases were included in Appellant's oral argument without 
citation and came to the attention of Appellant after Appellant's 
brief had been filed, but before decision. Appellant cites: 
Pledger v. Cox, 626 P. 2d, 415, 416 (Utah, 1981). The Court 
defined a trial anew from the Justice to the Second Court 
"as if it originated there." Id, at 416. 
In State v. Milliqan, 727 P. 2d, 213, 215 (Utah, 1986), the 
Court then stated in footnote No. 2 that, "We have 
jurisdiction over cases commencing in Justice Court where 
the issues raised involve a constitutional issue." 
And State v. Bartley, 124 Utah Advanced Reporter, 40, 42 
(Utah, 1939), states: 
The stopping of an automobile and the detention of its 
occupants constitutes a "seizure" within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment, . . . and must therefore be supported by 
at least a reasonable and articulable suspicion, based on 
objective facts, that the occupants are involved in 
criminal activity. 
S t o c e ^ 
MITCHEL Zi 
Attorney at Law 
JAVBR/ 
MZ:z 
Enc. 
cc: Charlene Barlow, Esq. 
Sherrie Ragan, Esq. 
Che as, Uti 
opinion. Plaintiff's prayer for attorney's 
fees is denied, and the parties are to bear 
their own costs. 
CROCKETT,* and' HOWE, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result. 
MAUGHAN, Chief Justice (concurring in 
the result and dissenting): 
I concur in the result, but refer to my 
dissenting opinions in Despain v. Despain, 
Utah, 610 P.2d 1303, 1307 (1980) and Chris-
tensen v. Christensen, Utah, 619 P.2d 1372 
(1980). 
Ray PLEDGER, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
S. Tony COX, Director, Drivers License 
Division, Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 16987. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 4, 1981. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Maurice D. Jones, J. pro tern., up-
held revocation of driver's license, and ap-
peal was taken. The Supreme Court, Oaks, 
J., held that statutory "trial de novo" pro-
vided to review administrative revocation 
of driver's license for refusal to submit to 
blood test for alcohol content is a complete 
retrial upon all the evidence, and upon such 
complete retrial, the Drivers License Divi-
sion should have the burden of proof and 
the burdeji of going forward with the evi-
dence. 
Reversed and remanded for new trial. 
I v. COX Utah 415 
626P.2d4!5 
1. Administrative Law and Procedure 
c=>744 
"De novo" means literally "anew, 
afresh, a second time," and has at least two 
possible interpretations when applied to ju-
dicial review of administrative action: (1) a 
complete retrial upon new evidence, and (2) 
a trial upon the record made before the 
lower tribunal, and the meaning of "trial de 
novo" in each statute is dictated by the 
wording and context of the statute in which 
it appears and by the nature of the adminis-
trative body, decision and procedure being 
reviewed. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Automobiles c=> 144.2(4) 
Statutory "trial de novo" provided to 
review administrative revocation of driver's 
license for refusal to submit to blood test 
for alcohol content is a complete retrial 
upon all the evidence, and upon such com-
plete retrial, the Drivers License Division 
should have the burden of proof and the 
burden of going forward with the evidence. 
U.C.A.1953, 41-2-19, 41-2-20, 41-6-44.-
10(b). 
3. Automobiles ®=> 144.2(4) 
Where review of administrative revoca-
tion of driver's license for refusal to submit 
to blood test for alcohol content was faulted 
by erroneous ground rule about the se-
quence and burden of proof, Supreme Court 
would not speculate about whether the er-
ror was prejudicial but would reverse and 
remand the case to district court for a new 
trial. 
Jo Carol Nesset-Sale, of Salt Lake Legal 
Defender* Association, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellant. 
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Bruce M. 
Hale, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and respondent. 
* CROCKETT, J.f concurred in this case prior to 
his retirement. 
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OAKS, Justice: 
The issue in this appeaf is the nature and 
allocation of the burden of proof and bur-
den of going forward with evidence in a 
district court's "trial de novo" review of an 
administrative revocation of a driver's 
license for refusal to submit to a blood test 
for alcohol content pursuant to the implied 
consent statute. 
After giving appellant a field sobriety 
test, a Salt Lake City police officer investi-
gating a traffic accident placed appellant 
under arrest for driving under the influence 
of alcohol. According to his testimony, the 
officer then requested appellant to take the 
breathalyzer test, and appellant refused. 
Following a hearing in which it determined 
that appellant had refused to subaiit to 
such test, the Drivers License Division 
(hereafter referred to as "the Division") 
revoked appellant's driver's license for one 
year, as required by U.C.A., 1953, 41-6-44.-
10(b). Appellant then filed a timely peti-
tion in the district count under the follow-
ing provision of that statute: 
Any person whose license has been re-
voked by the department under the provi-
sions of this section shall have the right 
to file a petition within thirty days there-
after for a hearing in the matter in the 
district court in the county in which such 
person shall reside. Such court is hereby 
vested with jurisdiction, and it shall be its 
duty to set the matter for trial de novo 
upon ten days' written notice to the de-
partment and thereupon to take testimo-
ny and examine into the facts of the case 
and to determine whether the petitioner's 
license is subject to revocation under the 
provisions of this act. 
At the hearing in the district court, the 
judge, sitting pro tern, required appellant to 
go forward with his evidence, ruling over 
objection that appellant had the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence 
that he had not refused a lawfully request-
ed breathalyzer test. Appellant thereupon 
called the arresting officer as a witness. 
At the conclusion of a brief hearing, the 
court found that appellant had not met his 
burden by a preponderance of the evidence, 
and ordered his driver's license revoked for 
one year. For the reasons stated herein, we 
reverse and remand for a new trial.* 
Respondent, Director of the Division, ar-
gues that the appellant, as the plaintiff in 
the district cofirt, had the burden of proof. 
He relies on several decisions from the 
highest courts of other states to the effect 
that in a trial de novo review of an adminis-
trative revocation of a driver's license the 
burden of going forward with evidence and 
the burden of persuading by a preponder-
ance of the evidence are on the licensee. 
This was the holding in Buda v. Fulton, 261 
Iowa 981, 157 N.W.2d 336 (1968), and Bur-
bage v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 252 
Or. 486, 450 P.2d 775 (1969), but there are 
decisions to the contrary on this same point 
in other states. Campbell v. Superior 
Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P.2d 685 (1971); 
Joyner v. Garrett, 279 N.C. 226, 182 S.E.2d 
553, rehearing denied 279 N.C. 397, 183 
S.E.2d Ml (1971); Chmelka v. Smith, 81 
S.D. 40, 130 N.W.2d 423 (1964). No Utah 
case has treated the meaning of "trial de 
novo" under U.C.A., 1953, 41-6-44.10(b), 
which has somewhat different language 
than any of the statutes involved in the 
cited cases. 
[1] The words "de novo," meaning liter-
ally "anew, afresh, a second time," Black's 
Law Dictionary 483 (4th ed. rev. 1968), have 
at least two possible interpretations when 
applied to judicial review of administrative 
action: "(1) A complete retrial upon new 
evidence; and (2) a trial upon the record 
made before the lower tribunal." D. & R. 
G. W. R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 
98 Utah 431, 436, 100 P.2d 552 (1940). In 
that case, the Court said that the first 
meaning was applicable to appeals from the 
justice court, where the case was tried in 
the district court "as if it originated there," 
and the second meaning was applicable to 
the court's treatment of equity appeals, 
where the parties were entitled to "a trial 
de novg upon the record." Id. 
The meaning of "trial de novo" in each 
statute is obviously dictated by the wording 
and context of the statute in which it ap-
pears and by the nature of the administra-
PLEDGER v. COX 
Cite as, Utah, 626 ?J26 415 
tive body, decision and procedure being re- Our conclusion 
viewed. Thus, in D. & R. G. W. R. Co. v. 
Public Service Commission, supra, the stat-
ute provided for review of a denial of a 
contract motor carrier permit by an "ac-
tion" for "plenary review" in the district 
court, whose hearing should "proceed as a 
trial de novo." Since "review" presupposed 
the continued existence of the Commission 
action, this Court held that the trial de novo 
specified there was "a trial upon the record 
made before the lower tribunal" without 
the submission of new testimony. The pur-
pose of the de novo requirement in that 
statute was to signify that the scope of the 
court's review of the record would include a 
fresh consideration of questions of fact as 
well as questions of law. 98 Utah at 438, 
100 ?2d at 555. 
Utah 417 
[2] In contrast, the district court which 
conducts the statutory "trial de novo" in 
this case is specifically given the "duty . . . 
to take testimony and examine into the 
facts of the case and to determine whether 
the petitioner's license is subject to revoca-
tion under the provisions of this act." 
U.C.A., 1953, 41-6~44.10(b). In context, 
this is a clear legislative direction that in 
hearings under this statute the district 
court should conduct what the D. & R. G. 
W. case called "a complete retrial upon new 
evidence." This interpretation of trial de 
novo affords a party who is about to suffer 
from administrative action a closer judicial 
scrutiny than a mere review of the record 
of agency action, and we think this prefera-
ble in view of the seriousness of the admin-
istrative action and the relative ease with 
which the limited factual issue can be sub-
jected to retrial in the district court. 
Upon such complete retrial, the Division 
should obviously have the burden of proof 
and the burden of going forward with the 
evidence. The petitioner must, of course, 
set the review process in motion by an 
appropriate and timely petition, and until 
and unless he has done so, the administra-
tive action is valid and binding. But once 
this is done, the district court has an entire-
ly new proceeding, with the burdens allo-
cated as if the Division were the moving 
Party. 
is consistent with—if not 
dictated by—this Court's decision in McAn-
erney v. State Dept. of Public Safety, 9 
Utah 2d 191, 341 P.2d 212 (1959), which 
involved the Division's suspension of a driv-
er's license under U.C.A., 1953, 41-2-19 for 
habitual negligent driving. The statute 
that permitted the aggrieved party to peti-
tion for a court "hearing" in that case, 
U.C.A., 1953, 41-2-20, is essentially identi-
cal to the statute in this case (41-6-44.-
10(b)) in its description of the nature of the 
hearing and the court's determination, ex-
cept that it makes no mention of a "trial de 
novo." At the hearing in McAnerney, as in 
this case, the district court put the burden 
on the licensee, requiring him "to refute the 
finding of the Department that the peti-
tioner was a habitually negligent driver." 
This Court reversed, holding that "it was 
the duty of the court to hear the case de 
novo, and not merely as a review of the 
action of the Department." 9 Utah 2d at 
194, 341 P.2d at 214. Since that procedure 
was required in a statute which did not 
even mention "trial de novo," the McAner-
ney case is an a fortiori authority for re-
quiring the Division to bear the burden of 
proof and the burden of going forward in a 
case where the statute explicitly directs a 
"trial de novo." 
[3] Even though the appellant in this 
case had the opportunity to present and did 
present his evidence in the district court (as 
respondent argues), when this was done un-
der a proceeding faulted by an erroneous 
ground rule about the sequence and burden 
of proof, as in the circumstances of this 
case, we should not speculate about wheth-
er the error was prejudical, but should re-
verse and remand the case to the district 
court for a new trial. So ordered. 
MAUGHAN, C. J., 
ART and HOWE, JJ., 
and HALL, STEW-
concur. 
STATE v 
Cite a* 727 ?2d 
N. George Daines, Logan, for defendants 
and respondents. 
PER CURIAM: 
Plaintiff brought suit against defendants 
to enforce the payment of monies owed 
under a contract for the purchase of a 
diamond. At the end of plaintiffs case in 
chief, defendants brought a motion to dis-
miss on the ground that there was no meet-
ing of the minds between the parties as to 
the purchase price. The trial court granted 
the motion by an unsigned minute entry 
dated November 21, 1984, and plaintiff ap-
peals from "the order entered in this action 
on November 21, 1984." No order appears 
in the record and apparently none was en-
tered. 
An appeal can be taken only from the 
entry of a final judgment that concludes 
the action. Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 
692 P.2d 765 (Utah 1984). An unsigned 
minute entry does not constitute a final 
judgment for purposes of appeal, and this 
Court has no jurisdiction to consider the 
merits of plaintiffs appeal. Utah R.Civ.P. 
58A(b) and (c); Utah R.App.P. 3(a), 4(a); 
South Salt Lake v. Burton, 718 P.2d 405 
(1986); State Tax Commission v. Erekson, 
714 P.2d 1151 (1986); Wisden v. City of 
Salina, 696 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1985); Wilson 
v. Manning, 645 P.2d 655 (Utah 1982). 
Plaintiffs appeal is dismissed. 
MILLIGAN Utah 213 
213 (Utah 1986) 
County, Kenneth Rigtrup, J., of driving 
without a license and failing to appear, and 
defendant appealed. The Supreme Court 
held that: (1) statutes requiring person ac-
cused of violating traffic laws to appear in 
court when he or she has promised to do so 
and requiring that all drivers hold valid 
license are valid exercise of state's police 
power, and by failing to abide thereby, 
defendant exposed himself to sanctions 
specified in statutes, notwithstanding de-
fendant's contention that he had constitu-
tional right to locomotion and that, so long 
as he operated vehicle in reasonable man-
ner, he was not subject to state's regula-
tion of its highways; (2) officer was autho-
rized to issue defendant citation for driving 
without license; and (3) sentences were not 
excessive or unreasonable. 
( O | KEY NUMBER SYSTE TEM} 
The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Howard Rodney MILLIGAN, 
Defendant and Appellant 
No. 860027. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct. 17, 1986. 
Defendant was convicted after jury tri-
al in the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
Affirmed. 
Stewart, Associate C.J., 
result. 
concurred in 
1. Courts <s=248 
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over 
cases commencing in justice court where 
issues raised involve constitutional issue. 
2. Automobiles ®=34 
Statute requiring person accused of vi-
olating traffic lawrs to appear in court when 
he or she has promised to do so and requir-
ing that all drivers hold valid license are 
valid exercise of state's police power, and 
by failing to abide thereby, defendant ex-
posed himself to sanctions specified in stat-
ute, notwithstanding defendant's conten-
tion that he had constitutional right to loco-
motion and that, so long as he operated 
vehicle in reasonable manner, he was not 
subject to state's regulation of its high-
ways. U.C.A.1953, 41-2-2, 41-6-168. 
3. Automobiles <£=>355(2) 
Defendant's statement to police officer 
at scene of accident that defendant was 
driver of van was sufficient to support 
operating automobile without license con-
727 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
viction, even though officer did not actual!) 
see defendant operating van. 
4, Criminal Law c»5o3 
Number of witnesses is not critical, so 
long as evidence presented is sufficient to 
support factual findings of jurv. 
"i. \utomobiles c=319 
Police officer for technical college in 
Salt Lake County had authority to issue 
defendant citation for driving without li-
cense. U.C.A 1953, 77™K%>>U). 
f> Vutomobiles c=»359 
Sentence of 15 days in jail, $150 fine, 
and $6 postassessment fees on driver's li-
cense violation and sentence of five days m 
jail, $50 fine, and $4 postassessment fee on 
failing to appear conviction, with both jail 
terms suspended on payment of fines, were 
not unreasonable, despite defendant's con-
tention he was fined excessive amount be-
cause of his request for jury trial; sen-
tences imposed by district court were pre-
cisely same as those imposed by justice 
court m nonjury trial 
7. Criminal Law 012U.8U) 
Sentences of 15 days in jail, $150 fine, 
and $6 postassessment fee, and five days in 
jail, $50 fine, and $4 postassessment fee on 
driver's license violation and failure to ap-
pear convictions were not cruel and un-
usual on ground fines were higher than 
guidelines set for bail, where sentences 
were within statutory allowances. 
Andrew A. \ aldez, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellant. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Bruce M 
Hale, Earl F, Dorius, Asst. Atty. Gens , 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent. 
PER CURIAM. 
This is a pro se appeal of district court 
convictions of driving without a license 
<l\C A.. 1953, § 41-2-2) and of failing to 
appear in court (U.C.A., 1953, § 41-6-168). 
Defendant was tried in absentia in a 
bench trial in justice court and found guilty 
as charged. He thereafter sought and was 
accorded a trial de novo in district court. 
The case was tried to a jury, and guilty 
verdicts were returned on both counts of 
the information. 
The only witness called to testify at trial 
was Glasper Bowman, who testified that he 
is a police officer for Utah Technical Col-
lege in Salt Lake County. On January 8, 
1985, Officer Bowman was dispatched to 
the scene of a traffic accident at 4500 
South and 1700 West. The accident was 
apparently caused by a small car which, as 
the result of icy road conditions, slid into 
defendant's van. The car was making a 
right turn, and the van was stopped at a 
traffic light When Officer Bowman ar-
rived at the scene, he was directed to the 
two drivers of the vehicles, both of whom 
were standing outside. The officer asked 
the drivers for their driver's licenses and 
vehicle registrations. Defendant produced 
his vehicle registration, but stated he did 
not have a driver's license. Officer Bow-
man called in a license check and was told 
there was not one on file.1 The officer 
issued defendant a citation for driving 
without a license. Defendant thereafter 
failed to appear in court as he had prom-
ised when he signed the traffic citation. 
He was tried and convicted in justice court 
and later, m <i trial de novo in district 
court. 
HI In his brief on appeal, defendant 
states that he "relies strictly on Constitu-
tional and Scriptural law " His points on 
appeal include (1) right to locomotion; (2) 
insufficiency of witnesses; (3) lack of au-
thority in the arresting officer; and (4) 
excessive fines. The State suggests that 
we summarily affirm in view of defend-
ant's failure to cite to the record and to 
support his arguments by legal analysis 
and authority. See State v. Sutton, 707 
P2d 681, 683 (Utah 1985V fan appellant's 
failure to cite to the record i.-> grounds for 
1. The officer later discovered that defendant 
had a license at one time but allowed it tn 
expire. 
STATE v 
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""' c the trial court); State v. Ami-
•'.* P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) (we 
^ to rule on an argument not sup-
authorities). However, since de-
; .s here pro se and because the 
appeal meets our threshold for review7,2 we 
"*
ri^ fly address the issues raised. 
\mt contends that he has a 
• ight of locomotion and that, 
so long as htj operates his vehicle in a 
reasonable manner, he is not subject to the 
state's regulation of its highways. We 
have clearly held that "conditions for oper-
ation of motor vehicles on public roads is a 
proper subject for state regulation artd con-
trol" State v. Chancellor, 704 P.2d 579, 
580 (Utah 1985}. U.C.A., 1953, § 41-2-2 
requires that ail drivers in Utah hold a 
valid license. Likewise, U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 41-6-168 requires that a person accused 
of violating the traffic laws must appear in 
court when he or she has promised to do 
so. The statutes are a valid exercise of the 
state's police power and, by failing to abide 
thereby, defendant has exposed himself to 
the sanctions specified. 
[3,4] Defendant contends that the evi-
dence is insufficient to support the jury 
verdict since Officer Bowman did not actu-
ally see defendant operating his van. We 
have held that a peace officer need not see 
the person driving, as long as he has rea-
sonable grounds to believe that the person 
was in actual physical control of the motor 
vehicle. Ballard v. State, Motor Vehicle 
Division, 595 P.2d 1302, 1306 (Utah 1979). 
In the instant case, defendant actually stat-
ed to the officer at the scene (Bowman) 
that he was the driver of the van. The 
officer therefore had reasonable grounds 
to believe that defendant was operating a 
vehicle. Defendant also suggests that the 
evidence is insufficient since Bowrman was 
the only witness to testify against him. 
The number of witnesses is not critical, so 
long as the evidence presented is sufficient 
2. We have jurisdiction over cases commencing 
in ji istice court where the issues raised involve a 
constitutional issue. State v Hamilton, 710 
P.2d 174 (Utah 1985), 
MULLIGAN Utah 215 
213 (Utah 1986) 
to support the factual findings of the jury. 
As abstracted above. Bowman's testimony 
is sufficient to support th*- \*-rdict in T;U* 
instant case. 
[5] Defendant argues that Officer Bow-
man niid not have the authority to arrest 
him because he was a category II officer at 
the time of the arrest. In January 1985, 
U.C.A., 1953, § 77-l-3(5)(b)(i) provided as 
follows: 
Category II peace officers shall have 
total peace officer authority wrhen on 
duty and when acting in relation to the 
responsibilities of the peace officer's 
agency; provided, however, category II 
peace officers shall have the powers of a 
category I peace officer over felonies or 
misdemeanors committed within their 
presence. 
Based on the foregoing statute and under 
the evidence adduced, it would appear that 
a category II peace officer would have had 
the authority to cite defendant for driving 
without a license. How-ever, the evidence 
at trial established that Bowman was a 
category I peace officer.3 U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 77-l-3(5)(a) specifically provided that 
any police officer employed by any public 
college is a category I peace officer. On 
the facts of this case, it is clear that Bow-
man was authorized to issue defendant a 
citation for driving without a license. 
[6,7] In his final argument, defendant 
challenges the reasonableness of his sen-
tence. On the driver's license violation, 
defendant was sentenced to 15 days in jail, 
$150 fine, and $6 post-assessment fee. For 
failing to appear, he was sentenced to 5 
days in jail, $50 fine, and $4 post-assess-
ment fee. Both jail terms were to be sus-
pended on payment of the fines. Defend-
ant contends that he was fined an excessive 
amount because of his request for a jury. 
This claim is not supported by the record. 
The sentences imposed by the district court 
3. When asked at trial what category of police 
officer he was, Bowman responded that he is "a 
Certified Academy One police officer." He also 
stated that he was operating in that capacity on 
January 8, 1985. 
727 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
were precisely the same as those imposed 
by the justice court in a nonjury trial. De-
fendant also contends that the sentences 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment 
since the fines are higher than the guide-
lines set for bail. This argument is spe-
cious. Since the sentences are within the 
statutory allowances, and because the stat-
utory5 sanctions are rational, defendant has 
not been subjected to cruel and unusual 
punishment. 
Affirmed. 
The ST ATE of Utah, Plaintiff • 
and Respondent, 
\ , 
Sandra Kay BANKHEAD, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 860012 
Supreme Court of Utah, 
Oct. 20, 1986. 
Defendant was convicted before the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Leonard R. Russon, J., of fraudulent use of 
a credit card, and she appealed. The Su-
preme Court held that failure of jury to 
:
—
K
*de some members of black race did not 
. .*e constitutional rights of black cie-
fi -i-i.int. where there was no evidence of 
-\ -•« matic exclusion of jurors based upon 
r.r i.ii considerations. 
Affirmed. 
.ry O U 2 
Defendant's motion to u '*v nan-
el was not made until after HM HMCH-MT 
2 in iry S=>33(1.1) • 
Sixth Amendment ensures only that a 
particular segment of the .community will 
not be systematically excluded from the 
jury venire; juries actually chosen need not 
mirror the community or reflect various 
distinctive groups in the population, U.S. 
C A Const. A mend. 6. 
3. Jury ^33(1 .3 ) 
Failure of jury to include some mem-
bers of black race did not violate constitu-
tional rights of black defendant, where 
there was no evidence of systematic exclu-
sion of jurors based upon racial considera-
tions. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
Thomas J. McCormick, o '.•'>>• ' '^ , 
for defendant and appellant. 
David L. Wilkinson. Atty. Gen., Earl F. 
Dorius, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff and respondent. 
PER CURIAM: " '' 
Defendant appeals her conviction under 
'.C.A , 1953, § 76-6-506.1 for fraudulent 
use of a credit card. 
Testimony at trial established that on 
August 30, 1985, defendant made several 
purchases of wearing apparel at various 
stores in downtown Salt Lake City. To pay 
for the merchandise, she used a credit card 
belonging to Louie Sims and signed "Rita 
Sims" on the charge forms. When an em-
ployee at one of the stores became suspi-
cious, the ^police wTere called. Defendant 
told the investigating officer that her name 
was Rita Sims and that the' credit card 
belonged to her husband. The officer 
thereupon called Louie Sims, who stated 
that his wife's name was not Rita and that 
he had not authorized anyone to use his 
credit card. Defendant wras thereupon ar-
rested. 
Mr. Sims owns an auto repair shop in 
Salt Lake City. He has been married to 
Thelma Sims for nineteen years, during 
which time he has periodically dated other 
w< >m*in. H*3 tp^tifjpd t h a t wVipn he fVct 
* ! v. Call CODE • co 
\dv. Rep. 37 Provo, Utah 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
William Clifford HARTLEY and Jay Charles 
Wade, 
Defendants and Appellant. 
No. 880375-CA 
FILED: December 20, 1989 . 
Seventh District, San Juan County 
Honorable Boyd Bunnell 
ATTORNEYS: 
Lyle R. Anderson, Monticello, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Barbara Bearnson, Salt 
Lake City, for Respondent 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Orme. 
OPINION 
BENCH, Judge: 
Defendant William Charles Bartley appeals 
from his conviction of theft, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§76-
6-404,-412(b)(i) (1#78). We affirm. 
FACTS 
The southeastern portion of San Juan 
County is a sparsely-populated area consis-
ting largely of farms, ranches, and oil and gas 
wells. The county sheriffs office had received 
reports for several months in late 1986 that 
"drip gas" thefts were occurring in the area. 
Drip gas, also known as "gas condensate/ is a 
liquid byproduct condensed from gas and 
stored at the wellhead for eventual sale to 
pipeline companies. Unrefined drip gas is clear 
in color and rank in odor, and may be used as 
a fuel or cleaning solvent. 
On December 26, 1986, at 11:06 p.m., a 
report was made to the sheriffs office that 
there were three pickup trucks with trailers 
and portable liquid storage tanks traveling into 
Patterson Canyon, an area of producing oil 
wells. Sheriff S. Rigby Wright and Deputy 
Sheriff Jack Kirby proceeded to the area to 
investigate. At the entrance to Patterson 
Canyon, they met with two oilfield workers 
who provided a description of the three vehi-
cles. The two officers then drove into the 
canyon to a point at which they could-see a 
couple of miles down the road. At approxi-
mately 12^ 30 a.m., they parkedJn th* miHHl* 
of the gravel roadway and_wai£ed^ > Fifteen or 
twenty minutes later, the officers observed 
three sets of headlights approaching. The 
sheriff instructed Kirby to use his vehicle's red 
MCE REPORTS 
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stoplight to stop the approaching vehicles 
when they were near enough, and then the 
sheriff walked up the road to wait for them. 
• The first vehicle stopped was a pickup truck 
with a liquid storage tank on its bed and three 
tanks on a trailer. The sheriff testified that the 
vehicles were "lugged down" and moving 
slowly as if heavily laden. He also said that he 
smelled the rank odor of drip gas. The driver, 
later identified as co-defendant Jay Charles 
Wade, got out and was told to secure his 
vehicle and walk up to the police car. A few 
moments later, a second pickup truck drove 
up and stopped. It was pulling a large tank 
and trailer unit. The driver, later identified as 
the defendant, got out, tucked something into 
the front of his pants, and began walking 
toward the police car. The sheriff, shotgun in 
hand, came up behind defendant and told him 
to keep his hands in view. Both men were 
frisked, handcuffed, and placed in the police 
car. A .38 caliber revolver was found in the 
waistband of defendant's pants during the 
frisk. 
The sheriff soon realized that the third 
vehicle had turned and fled. The officers, with 
the two suspects in tow, unsuccessfully sear-
ched for the third vehicle for almost an hour. 
Eventually, the officers met again with the two 
oilfield workers, who led them to a nearby 
drip gas collection site. There were various 
signs that a drip gas storage tank owned by 
Wintershall Oil & Gas had been drained. The 
ground was wet with water and paraffin, two 
substances that must frequently be drained off 
stored drip gas. The site was also crisscrossed 
with fresh tire marks and footprints and 
smelled strongly of drip gas. On the storage 
tank itself, the officers found an unauthorized 
seal on one of the two discharge valves. A 
similar seal was later found in defendant's 
truck. 
The officers then returned to the scene of 
the arrests and impounded the two trucks and 
trailers. The sheriff opened the valve on one 
tank and a liquid squirted out similar in app-
earance and smell to drip gas. The two susp-
ects were transported to jail and their shoes 
and outer clothing, which gave off an odor of 
drip gas, were impounded as evidence. The 
vehicles and trailers were stored in an 
impound yard. Later that morning, the sheriff 
plumbed the confiscated tanks and determined 
that two of the five tanks were full of drip 
gas, one was almost full, and two were empty. 
A jury trial was conducted on April 12 and 
13, 1988. A witness for the State testified that 
he saw three pickup trucks with trailers and 
tanks driving toward the oil field at about 
10:30 p.m. on the night of the theft. When the 
vehicles passed him, he heard the tanks rattle 
as if they were empty, and could smell no 
odor. The contractor who maintained the 
Wintershall site placed the value of the stolen 
drip gas at $929.50. He also testified that he 
was aware of legitimate drip gas transfers in 
the area, knew of none that would have occ-
urred the night in question, and, in any event, 
stated that no one could have lawfully drained 
the tank without his approval. He further 
stated that the smell of drip gas from the 
Wintershall site was unique, and matched the 
odor of gas in the tanks confiscated from 
defendants. 
A state criminologist testified that samples 
of drip gas residue taken from the Wintershall 
tank and samples taken from residues on 
defendant's clothing were chemically evalu-
ated and were found to be comparable. Tire 
marks and footprints at the scene of the theft 
were also found to be consistent with defen-
dants' vehicles and footwear. 
Defendants refuted the State's evidence by 
claiming that the impounded gas had been 
legally obtained elsewhere. Wade's uncle tes-
tified that he had traded defendant the fuel 
for a truckload of wood. Although defendant 
did not testify, Wade told the jury that defe-
ndant had picked up the fuel and had asked 
him to help move it. Wade testified that they 
were in the process of transporting it when 
they were stopped by the sheriff. 
The jury subsequently convicted both defe-
ndants of theft of drip gas valued at more 
than $250 and less than $1,000. 
THE STOP OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE 
Defendant first asserts that the "roadblock" 
which led to the 
seizure of evidence and his subsequent arrest 
was not of the variety approved in dicta in 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), nor 
for a demonstrable emergency, and was, the-
refore, illegal. 
Defendant mischaracterizes the stop of his 
vehicle. The record plainly indicates that this 
was not a^  random stop or checkpoint designed 
to screen vehicles for unsuspected illegal acti-
vity such as violations of safety, licensing, 
immigration, or wildlife conservation laws. 
Nor was it designed to capture escaped priso-
ners or felons fleeing from the police. Rather, 
it was designed to effectuate an investigative 
stop of three suspicious vehicles in an isolated 
area.1 When making such a stop, "officers 
may take such steps as are 'reasonably nece-
ssary to protect their personal safety and to 
maintain the status quo' so that the limited 
purposes of the stop may be achieved." United 
States v. Jones, 759 F.2d 633, 636-37 (8th 
Cir. 1985) (quoting United States v. Hensley, 
469 U.S. 221, 235 (1985)), cert, denied, 474 
U.S. 837 (1985). 
We find no particular significance in the 
fact that this stop was accomplished by means 
of a "roadblock" rather than by some other 
method. The blockade of a suspect vehicle 
"generally will be reasonable ... because of the 
chance that the suspect may flee upon the 
approach of police with resulting danger to the 
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public as well as to the officers involved." 
Jones, 759 F.2d at 638. In this case, there 
existed the potential of at least several susp-
ects, limited numbers of present and available 
law enforcement personnel, and a significant 
risk (later realized) that the suspects were 
armed. We find nothing unreasonable in the 
sheriffs selection of the ^o^idblock" as a 
means of minimizing the risk of flight or res-
istance by the suspects. 
The more important question in this case 
remains whether the stop of defendant's 
vehicle was legally justified. The jtoppiag of 
an automobile and the detention of its occu-
pants constitutes a "seizure" within the 
meaning of the fourth amendment, State v. 
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988), and must therefore be supported by at 
least a reasonable and articulable suspicion, 
based on objective facts, that the occupants 
are involved in criminal activity. State v. 
Carpena, 714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1986) (per 
curiam); Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1982); 
see also State v. Baumgaertel, 762 P.2d 2, 3 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (those facts may include 
rational inferences). 
Based on the objective facts as articulated 
by the trial court, we have no doubt that this 
threshold was passed. The sheriff had knowl-
edge of recent thefts of drip gas in the area 
and a report that three pickup trucks with 
empty storage tanks were seen driving into the 
desolate area in the dead of night. He was also 
aware that the legitimate transfer of drip gas 
was usually accomplished by commercial 
tanker trucks and semitrailers during daylight 
hours. The sheriffs information was then 
corroborated by the appearance of three 
pickup trucks with tanks and trailers, two of 
which, prior to being stopped, appeared to be 
heavily laden. We thus conclude that the 
initial stop was valid under the reasonable 
suspicion standard. 
PROBABLE CAUSE 
We now turn to the seizure of the tanks 
containing drip gas and the arrest of defen-
dant resulting from that seizure. A search and 
seizure conducted without a warrant is unre-
ajonablejjfiiLse unless it falls within a recog-
nized exception to the warrant requirement of 
the fourth amendment. State v. Holmes, 774 
P.2d 506, 510 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Objects 
in "plain view" constitute one such exception, 
and may be seized without a warrant if the 
police officer is lawfully present and the evi-
dence is clearly incriminating. Id. This excep-
tion encompasses evidence within "plain 
smell," see 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§2.2(a) (2d ed. 1987), there being no reaso-
nable expectation of privacy from the 
"inquisitive nostrils" of lawfully present offi-
cers. United States v. Johnston, 497 F.2d 397, 
398 (9th Cir. 1974). 
In reviewing the requirements of the plain 
. Hartley CODE^CO 
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view exception, we have already established 
J that the initial stop of defendant's vehicle was 
valid, thus making the sheriffs presence 
lawful. There is also testimony that the odor 
of drip gas was apparent to the officers, thus 
establishing that the drip gas evidence could be 
plainly smelled. We need.only to determine 
whether that odor was clearly incriminating. 
"Clearly incriminating" is a term which has 
been defined as "probable cause to associate 
the property with criminal activity." Holmes, 
774 P.2d at 510 (quoting State v. Kelly, 718 
P.2d 385, 390 (Utah 1986)). 
Defendant argues that because the sheriff 
had no actual knowledge that a theft of drip 
gas had occurred at the time defendant was 
stopped, "probable cause" for the seizure of 
the evidence or for his arrest cannot be esta-
blished. However, officers cannot be expected 
to begin their investigations only after the 
confirmation of a theft, and frequently 
develop probable cause prior to such reports. 
See, e.g., Dixon v. United States, 296 F.2d 
427 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (discovery of fur piece 
with price tag attached led to arrest for receipt 
of stolen property); People v. Carnes, 173 Cal. 
App. 2d 559, 343 P.2d 626 (1959) (tools and 
radio led to arrest for laboratory burglary); 
State v. Temple, 1 Or. App. 91, 488 P.2d 1380 
(1971) (copper wire in truck led to arrest for 
theft), cert, denied, 406 U.S 973 (1972); State 
v. Ballenberger, 652 P.2d 927 (Utah 1982) (CB 
radio on backseat led to arrest for vehicle 
burglary); State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 
(Utah 1980) (tools and coins led to arrest for 
burglary of laundromat); State v. Harris, 78 
Wash. 2d 558, 477 P.2d 923 (1970) (en banc) 
(sledgehammer and firearm led to arrest for 
burglary of restaurant); State v. Brooks, 57 
Wash. 2d 422, 357 P.2d 735 (1960) 
(unhemmed pants with attached sales tags led 
to arrest for larceny). 
In establishing probable cause, as the term 
suggests, we deal not in certainties, but in 
"probabilities." See Brinegar v. United States, 
338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). The quantum of 
evidence needed for probable cause is signifi-
cantly less than that needed to prove guilt. Stare 
v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1112 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). Whether probable cause exists 
"depends upon an examination of all the inf-
ormation available to the searching officer in 
light of the circumstances as they existed at 
the time the search was made." State v. 
Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986). The 
officer is also "entitled to assess the facts in 
light of [his or her] experience." Holmes, 114 
P.2d at 509 (quoting United States v. Bngnoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975)). 
The facts known to the sheriff at the time 
included: recent thefts of drip gas in the area; 
the late hour; the infrequently traveled roads; 
the report of potential theft activity by those 
with knowledge of legal gas transfers; the 
presence of trucks with empty tanks headed 
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into the area; the transportation of drip gas by 
atypical means; the lack of a retail market for 
the sale of drip gas; and most significantly, 
the distinctive, if not unique, odor of drip gas-
-an odor the sheriff testified he recognized 
from previous investigative work. 
Absent clear error, we will not disturb a 
trial court's factual assessment underlying a 
decision to deny a motion to suppress evid-
ence. State v. Droneburg, 120 Utah Adv. Rep. 
27, 28 (Ct. App. 1989). "Clear error is indic-
ated when the trial court's factual assessment 
is against the clear weight of the evidence or it 
induces a firm conviction that a mistake has 
been committed." Id. No clear error is indic-
ated here. The officers had reasonable suspi-
cion to stop defendant's vehicle. Once they 
recognized the distinctive odor of drip gas, 
that suspicion ripened into probable cause to 
associate that odor with criminal activity. The 
requirements of the plain view exception were 
satisfied, and the evidence could properly be 
seized without a warrant. 
We also conclude that defendant's arrest 
was proper: 
An officer may arrest an individual 
without a warrant either when he 
has reasonable cause to believe a 
felony has been committed and that 
the person arrested committed it or 
when the officer has reasonable 
cause to believe the person has 
committed a public offense and 
there is a reasonable basis for beli-
eving the person will destroy or 
conceal evidence of the commission 
of the offense. 
State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1383 (Utah 
1986); see also Utah Code Ann. §77-7-2 
(Supp. 1989). "Reasonable cause" is determ-
ined objectively, i.e., "whether from the facts I 
known to the officer, and the inferences which 
fairly might be drawn therefrom, a reasonable 
and prudent person in his position would be 
justified in believing that the suspect had 
committed the offense." State v. Cole, 61A 
P.2d 119, 125 (Utah 1983) (quoting State v. 
Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 318, 495 P.2d 1259 
(1972)); see also Banks, 720 P.2d at 1383. 
The officers in this case detected the disti-
nctive odor of drip gas after stopping defen-
dant's vehicle. It is well-established that 
probable cause for arrest may arise from an 
officer's sense of smell. See, e.g., Johnson v. 
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948) (opium); 
State v. Valenzuela, 121 Ariz. 274, 589 P.2d 
1306, 1307 (1979) (en banc) (marijuana). 
Under the circumstances, reasonable and 
prudent persons could believe that the drip gas 
had been stolen. As stated previously, the fact 
that the officers had no specific knowledge 
that the drip gas was indeed stolen is not cri-
tical since "a police officer is not required to 
meet any such standard of perfection as to 
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demand an absolutely certain judgment before 
he may act." State v. Eastmond, 28 Utah 2d 
129, 132, 499 P.2d 276, 278 (1972) (clear error 
standard of review). 
We conclude that the trial court committed 
no clear error either in its denial of defen-
dant's motion to suppress or in its finding of 
probable cause for arrest. 
ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE 
Over defendant's objection, the court 
I admitted testimony that defendant was carr-
I ying a .38 caliber revolver when he was arre-
sted. Similarly, the court permitted the jury to 
hear testimony that two days after defendant's 
arrest, the lock and chain on the gate to the 
sheriff's impound lot had been cut off, and 
the pickup trucks and trailers seized as evid-
ence were gone. Defendant now argues that 
the admission of such evidence was erroneous 
because it was irrelevant and prejudicial. 
The State argues that the admission of the 
firearm evidence was not erroneous on the 
basis that it was "relevant to explain the circ-
umstances of defendant's crime and arrest." 
The State does not fully explain this state-
ment, but we note that the admission of evi-
dence of "other crimes, wrongs or acts" may 
be relevant to show "motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
or absence of mistake or accident." See Utah 
R. Evid. 404(b). The record is unclear why the 
trial court admitted this evidence, but the fact 
that defendant secreted this firearm on his 
person immediately prior to his arrest seems 
relevant to show intent, preparation, plan, or 
knowledge. 
The State further defends the admission of 
testimony regarding the removal of the imp-
ounded trucks and trailers as relevant to 
explain the absence of physical evidence at 
trial. We agree. The trial judge stated: 
So, I don't think you can have it 
both ways ... that you can argue 
lack of evidence to convict, and 
then at the same time restrict the 
State from explaining why some of 
the evidence is not here for the 
jury's observation .... I'm sure 
we're going to be getting into 
values and quantities of the material 
that was there, which will have to 
be given probably by estimate 
rather than actual measurement. 
And I think the jury is entitled to 
know why those things are being 
used. 
Although all relevant evidence is admissible, 
see Utah R. Evid. 402, such evidence may be 
excluded "if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice." Utah R. Evid. 403. The question of 
whether the probative value of the evidence is 
substantially outweighed by its unfair prejud-
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icial effect is "generally entrusted to the sound 
discretion of the trial judge and will not be 
upset on appeal absent manifest error." Stare 
in re R.D.S., 777 P.2d 532, 535 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) (quoting State v. Maurcr, 770 P.2d 
981,983 (Utah 1989)). 
We see no manifest error. Evidence is unf-
airly prejudicial if it "'appeals to the jury's 
sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, pro-
vokes its instinct to punish,' or otherwise 
'may cause a jury to base its decision on 
something other than the established propos-
itions in the case.'" Maurer, 770 P.2d at 984 
(quoting Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961, 972-
73 (3d Cir. 1980)). The balancing test of rule 
403 thus excludes "matter of scant or cumul-
ative probative force, dragged in by the heels 
for the sake of its prejudicial effect." /d. 
(quoting United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 
700, 707 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 862 
(1979)). In agreement with the trial court's 
rulings, we conclude that the probative value 
of the challenged testimony exceeded its prej-
udicial effect. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
We last address an issue first raised not by 
defendant, but by the State, in adherence to 
its duty to promote justice. See State v. 
Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 225 (Utah 1980). During 
the course of trial, co-defendant Wade was 
cross-examined by the prosecutor about his 
post-arrest silence in explaining his posses-
sion of drip gas. An objection was timely 
made by Wade's counsel, but overruled by the 
court. The State concedes that the failure by 
the court to sustain the objection may have 
impliedly violated this defendant's constituti-
onal right against self-incrimination.2 See 
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610,619 (1976); Griffin 
v. California, 380 U . S . 6 0 9 , 613 
(1965), reh'g denied, 381 U.S. 957 (1965); State 
v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 554 (Utah 
1987); Stare v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1205 
(Utah 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 739 P.2d 
628 (1987). The State further suggests, 
however, that the error, if any, was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Tillman, 750 
P.2d. at 555 ("[A]n otherwise valid conviction 
should not be set aside if the reviewing court 
may confidently say, on the whole record, that 
the constitutional enor was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.") (quoting Delaware v. Van 
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)). 
Direct reference by a prosecutor to 
a defendant's decision not to testify 
is always a violation of the defen-
dant's fifth amendment right 
against self-incrimination. Indirect 
references to a defendant's failure 
to testify are constitutionally imp-
ermissible if the comments were 
manifestly intended to be or were of 
such a character that the jury would 
naturally and necessarily construe 
them to be a comment on the def-
endant's failure to testify. 
Tillman, 750 P.2d at 554 (footnote omitted). 
In Tillman, there was overwhelming evid-
ence of Tillman's guilt, the remarks of the 
prosecutor were isolated, and the jury was 
instructed not to draw any adverse presump-
tion from Tillman's failure to testify. Id. at 
555. Similarly, the circumstantial evidence of 
defendant's guilt in the instant case was ove-
rwhelming, the offensive cross-examination 
was isolated rather than pervasive, and the 
judge gave the jury the following curative 
instruction: 
You are instructed that the Defen-
dant Bartley in this case has not 
taken the witness stand in his own 
behalf, and that this is his legal and 
constitutional right and is not any 
evidence of his guilt, directly or 
indirectly, and you are instructed 
that you are not to consider his 
failure to testify in this case for any 
purpose, and [neither] should you 
allude to such failure in your deli-
berations or consider it for any 
purpose whatsoever. 
In view of these factors, we hold that any 
error in defendant's case resulting from the 
cross-examination of co-defendant Wade 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Defendant's conviction is affirmed. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. This conclusion is supported by the fact that a 
roadblock for any other purpose would have been 
senseless in view of the sheriffs testimony that only 
one unrelated vehicle was observed in the area 
during the 4-5 hour period following defendant's 
arrest. 
2. Defendant also claims ineffective assistance of 
counsel based on his counsel's initial failure to 
object to the testimony, and the failure to include 
that issue in his opening appellate brief. Utah has 
adopted a two-part test for the review of such 
claims: A defendant must show that his or her 
counsel performed deficiently such lhat the perfor-
mance fell below an objective standard of reason-
able professional judgment, and that the perform-
ance was prejudicial, such that absent the error, a 
different outcome was reasonably likely. State v. 
Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893-94 & n.30 (Utah 1989); see 
also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687 (1984). The initial failure to object to the testi-
mony may well have constituted deficient pe^orm-
ance. See Lairby, 699 P.2d at 1205. However, the 
cross-examination was objected to during trial, and 
the issue was raised for appellate review, albeit by 
the State. We therefore cannot conclude that 
counsel's deficient performance induced a different 
result. Defendant has not otherwise demonstrated 
deficient performance in his counsel's representa-
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On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Defendant Lee Christensen, convicted in circuit 
court of operating a motor vehicle in Utah while his privi-
lege to drive was suspended, claims error in the dismissal of 
his appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. He argues, inter 
alia, that the court violated his constitutional right to an 
appeal, as guaranteed by article I, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution, when it dismissed his appeal and that even if 
the court did not violate his constitutional rights, it 
nonetheless erred in dismissing his appeal because he 
properly preserved a constitutional issue, as required by 
section 77-35-26(13)(a) of the Code. We affirm. 
Christensen, a Wyoming resident and a holder of a 
Wyoming driver's license, was involved in an automobile 
accident while driving in Utah in October of 1986. In 
February of 1987, the state of Utah suspended for one year 
Christensen's privilege to operate a motor vehicle in Utah. 
Sfifi Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-19 (1981) (amended 1987, 1988, & 
1989; now codified at § 41-2-128 (Supp. 1989)). The state 
took this action because Christensen failed to provide 
security for the damages he caused in the 1986 accident. 
In September of 1987, Christensen was stopped by the 
police while driving within the city limits of Monticello, 
Utah. He was arrested and charged with two violations: 
(i) driving during suspension, and (ii) driving without 
insurance. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-28 (1981) (amended 
1987 & 1989; now codified at § 41-2-136 (Supp. 1989));* 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-302 (Supp. 1986) (amended 1987). 
Christensen posted bond, and the matter was scheduled for a 
hearing before a justice of the peace, pursuant to section 
78-5-4 of the Code. Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-4 (1987) 
(repealed 1989; now codified at § 78-5-114 (Supp. 1989)).2 
In January of 1988, Christensen appeared before a 
justice of the peace and unsuccessfully argued that the 
1. At the time Christensen was arrested, Monticello had 
adopted by ordinance the Utah traffic laws in effect in 1985. 
Therefore, Christensen was actually charged with violating two 
Monticello ordinances. However, since the ordinances are 
identical to certain sections of the Utah Code, this opinion 
will refer to those sections. Section 41-2-28 provides: 
Any person whose operator's or 
chauffer's license has been suspended or 
revoked, as provided in this act, and who 
shall drive any motor vehicle upon the 
highways of this state while such license 
is suspended or revoked, shall be guilty 
of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction 
shall be punished as provided in section 
41-2-30. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-28 (1981) (amended 1987 & 1989; now 
codified at § 41-2-136 (Supp. 1989)). Section 41-2-l(o) 
defines "license" to be "the privilege to operate a motor 
vehicle over the highways of this state." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-2-1 (1981) (amended 1987 & 1989; now codified at 
§ 41-2-102(12) (Supp. 1989)). Section 41-2-l(p) defines 
"license certificate" as "the evidence of the privilege to 
operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this state." 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-l(p) (1981) (amended 1987 & 1989; now 
codified at § 41-2-102(13) (Supp. 1989)). 
2. Section 78-5-4 provides: 
Justices' courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction of the following public 
offenses committed within the respective 
counties in which such courts are 
established: 
(1) all class B and class C 
misdemeanors punishable by a fine no 
greater than the maximum fine for a class 
B or C misdemeanor under 76-3-301, or by 
imprisonment in the county jail or 
municipal prison not exceeding six months, 
or by both the fine and imprisonment; and 
(2) all infractions and the 
punishments prescribed for them. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-4 (1987) (repealed 1989; now codified 
at § 78-5-114 (Supp. 1989)). 
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••driving under suspension* charge against him should be 
dismissed. He was convicted of that charge, sentenced to 
thirty days in the county jail, and required to pay a $200 
fine- The sentence was stayed, and Christensen appealed to 
the circuit court under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 26. 
That rule provides in part: 
(13) An appeal may be taken to the 
circuit court from a judgment rendered in 
the justice court in accordance with the 
provision of this rule, except: 
(a) the case shall be tried anew in 
the circuit court and the decision of the 
circuit court is final except where the 
validity or constitutionality of a statute 
or ordinance is raised in the justice 
court. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 26(13)(a) (1987) (amended 1989; codified at 
§ 77-35-26(13)(a) (Supp. 1989) (code provision, but not 
rule, repealed effective July 1, 1990)).3 A trial de novo 
was held in the circuit court in March of 1988. Christensen 
was again convicted of driving under suspension and again 
fined $200 and sentenced to thirty days in jail. 
Christensen next appealed to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, which dismissed the appeal, reasoning that under 
rule 26(13)(a), it had no jurisdiction to hear the matter 
because -the validity or constitutionality of a statute or 
ordinance [had not been] raised in the justice court.* Utah 
R. Crim. P. 26(13)(a); City of Monticello v. Christensen, 769 
P.2d 853, 854 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The court of appeals 
reached this conclusion after reviewing the documentary 
records from the justice court and from the circuit court. 
Neither of these evidenced a raising of a challenge to a 
statute's validity or constitutionality, although the court 
of appeals acknowledged that it could not determine with 
certainty what had occurred in these two courts because no 
transcript is kept in a justice court and Christensen had not 
provided a tape or transcript of the circuit court hearing 
although one was kept. 769 P.2d at 855. 
3. Section 78-5-14 of the Code also authorizes persons to 
appeal justice court decisions to a circuit court. That 
section provides: 
Any person dissatisfied with a 
judgment rendered in a justices' [sic] 
court, whether the same was rendered on 
default or after trial, is entitled to a 
trial de novo in the circuit court of the 
county as provided by law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-14 (1987) (repealed 1989; now codified 
at § 78-5-120 (Supp. 1989)). 
Following the court of appeals' denial of his 
petition for a rehearing, Christensen sought certiorari from 
this Court. We granted the writ in order to consider the 
question of whether the appeal procedure prescribed in 
rule 26(13)(a) comports with the appeal guarantee of 
article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
Article I, section 12 provides in part: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall have the right to appear and defend 
in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in 
his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory 
process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury 
of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12 (emphasis added). 
Christensen claims that his right -to an appeal" 
was violated when the court of appeals refused to give his 
appeal the plenary consideration usually afforded any other 
appeal from the circuit or district court. Specifically, 
he argues that the guarantee of "an appeal" in article I, 
section 12 connotes an on-the-record review of the trial 
court's action, something that by definition cannot be 
provided via a trial de novo in the circuit court. There-
fore, the only vehicle for vindication of his rights to an 
appeal is full review of the circuit court action by the 
court of appeals, and the limitation on the scope of the 
court of appeals' review imposed by rule 26(13)(a) is 
unconstitutional. 
In considering Christensen's claim that 
rule 26(13)(a) is unconstitutional, we follow the settled 
rule that "legislative enactments are endowed with a strong 
presumption of validity and will not be declared unconsti-
tutional unless there is no reasonable basis upon which they 
can be construed as conforming to constitutional require-
ments." In re Criminal Investigation, 7th Dist. Ct., 754 
P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988); see aXSP Blue Cross & Blue Shield 
v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989); City of West Jordan 
v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 767 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 
1988). And we accord a lower court's statement of the law, 
statutory interpretation, or legal conclusion no particular 
deference, but review it for correctness. See, e.g., State 
v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 127 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Feb. 8, 1990); 
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State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1123 (Utah 1989); Utah 
State Coalition of Senior Citizens v. Utah Power & Light 
£Q^, 776 P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 1989). 
Article I, section 12 provides, "In criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall have the right . . . to 
appeal in all cases." Utah Const, art. I, § 12. 
Rule 26(13)(a) labels an "appeal" a trial de novo in the 
circuit court, with only limited review of that decision 
by the court of appeals. The determination of whether 
rule 26(13)(a) is constitutional depends on what is meant 
by the word "appeal" in article I, section 12. We conclude 
that in Utah, at least, it is settled that the right to an 
"appeal" from a court not of record is satisfied by provi-
sion for a trial de novo in a court of record. The reasons 
for this conclusion are largely historical. 
The guarantee in article I, section 12 providing 
a right of appeal has been in the constitution since 
statehood. From 1896 until 1984, it coexisted with a 
version of article VIII, section 9 of the Utah Constitution 
which provided in part: 
Appeals shall also lie from the final 
judgment of justices of the peace in civil 
and criminal cases to District Courts on 
both questions of law and fact, with such 
limitations and restrictions as shall be 
provided by law; and the decision of the 
Pistrict Courts on such appeals shall be 
final, except in cases involving the 
validity or constitutionality of a statute. 
Utah Const, art. VIII, § 9 (repealed 1984) (emphasis 
added). The right of appeal from a justice of the peace to 
the district court referred to in article VIII, section 1 was 
a trial de novo because justice courts have never been courts 
of record. 
Statutes with language substantially similar to 
article VIII, section 9 have existed since statehood. For 
example, chapter 109, section 18 of the 1901 Laws of Utah 
provided in part: 
From all final judgments of a city 
court . . . an appeal may be taken by 
either party in a civil case, or by the 
defendant in a criminal case, to the 
district court of the county in the manner 
and with like effect as is now, or may be 
provided by law for appeals from justices' 
courts in similar cases, and from all 
final judgments in the district courts 
rendered upon such appeals, an appeal may 
be taken to the supreme court in like 
manner as if said actions were originally 
commenced in the district court . . . and 
provided further* that in all cases 
involving the validity or constitutionality 
of the statute, there shall be a right of 
appeal to the supreme court* 
1901 Utah Laws ch. 109, § 18 (emphasis added),4 
In decisions from statehood until 1983, this Court 
repeatedly held that a person dissatisfied with a justice 
court decision could appeal that decision to a district 
court and that the district court decision was final unless 
the validity or constitutionality of a statute was at issue, 
not on appeal, but in the lower court. See, e.g., State v. 
Van Gervan, 657 P.2d 1377 (Utah 1983); State v. Munoer, 642 
P.2d 721 (Utah 1982); Vernal Citv v. Critton. 565 P.2d 408 
(Utah 1977); State v. Lyte. 75 Utah 283, 284 P. 1006 (1930); 
Eureka City v. Wilson. 15 Utah 53, 48 P. 41 (1897), aff'd, 
173 U.S. 32 (1899); see alSO State v. Tavlor. 664 P.2d 439 
(Utah 1983). In State y. Lyte, 75 Utah at 287, 284 P.2d at 
1007, this Court explicitly rejected a challenge based on 
article I, section 12 to a statute worded very similarly to 
rule 26(13)(a). That statute restricted Supreme Court 
review of these de novo trials in district court to 
situations involving a challenge to a statute's validity or 
constitutionality.5 We held that the statute was 
constitutional as the restriction complained of was in fact 
found in the Constitution itself. The validity of Lyte has 
never been questioned. 
4. The city courts were created in 1901 Utah Laws chapter 109 
and were part of a statutory scheme that included both city 
courts and justice courts. In 1977, when the circuit court 
system was adopted by the legislature, all city courts were 
eliminated. See 1901 Utah Laws ch. 109, § 1; 1977 Utah Laws 
ch. 77. 
5. Section 1668 of Utah Compiled Laws (1917) provided: 
Appeals shall lie from the final judgments 
of justices of the peace, in civil and 
criminal cases, to the district courts, on 
both questions of law and fact, with such 
limitations and restrictions as are or may 
be provided by law; and the decision of 
the district courts on such appeals shall 
be final, except in cases involving the 
validity or constitutionality of a statute. 
Utah Compiled Laws tit. 21, ch. 3, § 1668 (1917); see also 
1919 Utah Laws ch. 34, § 1717. 
M ^ o o m co 
Before the 1984 amendments to article VIII, then, 
the "appeal* right in article I, section 12, in the context 
of review of justice court decisions, was satisfied by a 
one-judge trial de novo procedure unless the validity or 
constitutionality of a statute was raised before the justice 
court. Neither a review on the record nor a review by a 
multijudge panel was a constitutionally necessary part of the 
appeals process from justice court decisions. Therefore, for 
us to find that the procedure in use since statehood and now 
embodied in rule 26 is now unconstitutional, we would have to 
conclude that the 1984 amendments to article VIII require 
that all appeals from courts of record, including the circuit 
court, entitle the appellant to a plenary review on the 
record. 
The amendments in 1984 substantially altered 
article VIII. In particular, old section 9 was repealed and 
is no longer pertinent. Much of its substance is now found 
in article VIII, section 5, which provides: 
The district court shall have 
original jurisdiction in all matters 
except as limited by this constitution or 
by statute, and power to issue all 
extraordinary writs. The district court 
shall have appellate jurisdiction as 
provided by statute. The jurisdiction of 
all other courts, both original and 
appellate, shall be provided by statute. 
Except for matters filed originally with 
the Supreme Court, there shall be in all 
cases an appeal of right from the court of 
original jurisdiction to a court with 
appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5 (emphasis added). The specific 
language in the pre-1984 article VIII, section 9 that 
permitted appeals from justice courts to district courts and 
described restrictions on any further appeal is missing from 
the new article VIII. Was the elimination of this language 
by the 1984 amendment intended to abrogate the single-judge 
de novo "appeal" of justice court decisions? We find no 
indication of such an intention. 
Article VIII, section 5 clearly provides that "the 
district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided 
by statute" and that "the jurisdiction of all other courts, 
both original and appellate, shall be provided by statute." 
This language is plain and unambiguous. It acknowledges that 
the district court may be given appellate jurisdiction, which 
it has had since statehood with respect to justice court 
appeals, and it also gives the legislature the authority to 
bestow original and appellate jurisdiction on other courts. 
n 
This simply recognizes the well-settled principle that it is 
within the legislature's prerogative to define a court's 
appellate jurisdiction over decisions from any lower court so 
long as such jurisdiction is not expressly prohibited by the 
state constitution. £&&, e.g., State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 
439, 441 (Utah 1983). And as Lyte held, there is nothing in 
article I, section 12 that precludes the legislature from 
establishing a trial de novo in another court as an "appeal." 
Looking beyond the plain language of article VIII, 
section 5, we find nothing in the legislative history of the 
1984 amendments to article VIII that indicates an intention 
to prohibit single-judge de novo "review" of justice court 
decisions or to require a plenary, on-the-record review of 
that de novo proceeding. In fact, the reports prepared for 
the legislature by the Constitutional Revision Commission 
("CRC"), which held hearings on the need for a judicial 
article amendment and had drafted the specific language of 
new article VIII, section 5, never mention this possibility. 
Instead, they reflect an intention on the CRC's part that the 
legislature have the flexibility to determine the jurisdiction 
of most of the state's courts. For example, in discussing 
the proposed language for article VIII, section 5, which 
indicates that the original and appellate jurisdictions of 
all courts other than district courts should be provided by 
statute, the 1982 CRC report stated: 
The provisions mandating a right of appeal 
directly to the district court from 
justices [sic] of the peace courts is 
[sic] deleted from the new language, 
thereby providing the legislature the 
flexibility to establish an orderly 
hierarchy of appeals which could further 
reduce duplication and provide more 
efficient adjudication of cases. 
Office of Legislative Research, Report of the Constitutional 
Revision Commission 23 (January 1982). In discussing the 
same section in the 1983 report, the CRC stated: "The 
jurisdiction of . . . courts [other than the district 
courts] is to be established by statute." Office of 
Legislative Research, Report of the Constitutional Revision 
Commission 28 (January 1984). The CRC thought that the 
authority to establish the jurisdiction of most state courts 
properly lies with the legislature. 
If the 1984 amendments were intended to prohibit 
the then-existing appeal procedure for justice courts, it is 
more than strange that neither the CRC nor anyone in the 
legislature thought it necessary to observe that passage of 
the amendments would void rule 26(13)(a) or that new 
legislation would be needed immediately to provide for 
justice court appeals. In fact, the then-existing statu-
tory provisions dealing with justice court appeals remained 
unchanged until 1986, when they were amended to shift 
justice court appeals from the district court to the circuit 
court as part of a general reshuffling of jurisdiction that 
accompanied the creation of the court of appeals. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-4-7.5 (1987) (amended 1988 & 1989). 
However, the limitations on further review of the judgment 
involved in the de novo proceeding remained unchanged from 
its 1896 formulation. Compare Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-35-26(k)(l) (Supp. 1986) with Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-35-26(13)(a) (Supp. 1987). 
Because nothing in the plain language of the 
amended article VIII, section 5 or in its history suggests 
an intent to require review on the record for a trial de 
novo where justice court appeals are concerned, we conclude 
that rule 26(13)(a) satisfies article I, section 12 and 
article VIII, section 5. 
The next question is whether the court ot appeals 
correctly concluded that Christensen failed to properly 
raise the issue of the invalidity or unconstitutionality of 
the ordinance under which he was charged. As mentioned 
earlier, Christensen provided no transcript of the circuit 
court proceeding to the court of appeals. Therefore, the 
appeals court reviewed the pleadings filed in justice court 
and circuit court and concluded that he had not raised any 
such issue. We see no reason to disturb that conclusion. 
The court of appeals' decision dismissing 
Christensen's appeal for lack of jurisdiction is affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Richard C. Howe, Associate 
Chief Justice 
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice 
DURHAM, Justi c £: (Di ssenti ng) 
I dissent. Article I, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution provides that w[i]n criminal prosecutions the 
accused shall have the right to . . . appeal in all cases." 
The question before this Court is whether a new trial 
constitutes an "appeal" within the meaning of that 
constitutional provision. I grant everything that the 
majority opinion has said about the history of the 
constitutional language and the statutory definitions of 
jurisdiction. I point out/ however, that this Court is both 
the ultimate source of content for the meaning of 
constitutional language and the promulgating agency for rule 
26(13)(a).1 That being the case, I see no reason for us 
to maintain a semantically and conceptually illogical and 
confusing premise merely because it has its roots in 
history. The majority is correct in saying that "in Utah 
. . . it is settled that the right to an 'appeal' from a 
court not of record is satisfied by provision for a trial de 
novo in a court of record." That is true, however, only 
because of peculiar constitutional language that has now 
been removed from the judicial article, i.e., the former 
constitutional provision calling trials de novo "appeals."2 
Now that the anomalous language has been removed from the 
constitution, it should no longer be "settled" as a matter 
of constitutional law that the requirement of appellate 
review may be satisfied by a new trial in a court of 
limited, or even general, jurisdiction. I would conclude 
that the 1984 amendments to article VIII do indeed require 
that a defendant be entitled in every case to one plenary 
review on the record. 
1. This Court, in "In re Rules of Procedure and Evidence to 
be used in the Courts of this State," filed January 13, 1989, 
provided per curiam: 
Pursuant to the provisions of article 
VIII, section 4 of the Constitution of 
Utah, as amended, and rule 11-101(3)(E) of 
the Code of Judicial Administration, the 
Court adopts all existing statutory rules 
of procedure and evidence contained in 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-35-1 to -33 (1982 & 
Supp. 1988) not inconsistent with or 
superseded by rules of procedure and 
evidence heretofore adopted by this Court, 
with the exception of section 77-35-12(g) 
(see State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 
1987) and section 77-35-21.5(4)(c) and 
(d)) (£££ State v. Copelanfl, [765 p.2d 
1266 (Utah 1988)]). Effective as of 
January 1 1989. 
2. See old article VIII, section 9. 
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I have no quarrel with the notion that the 
Legislature may bestow both original and appellate 
jurisdiction on any court. I do contest the implicit 
assertion of the majority, however, that the Legislature, 
rather than this Court, may decide what is adequate to 
constitute an ••appeal" within the meaning of article VIII of 
the constitution. I also maintain that contemporary 
understanding of the concept of criminal appeals mandates at 
least review of convictions upon a record by a superior 
tribunal for purposes of detecting procedural and evidentiary 
errors, as well as constitutional ones. The principle that 
the Legislature might have the power, for example, to grant 
new trials in felony criminal cases in satisfaction of the 
right-to-appeal provisions of our constitution is disturbing 
and anomalous and would not, I suspect, be upheld by the 
majority. Yet the majority's logic must embrace that 
result.3 i submit, rather, that the following doctrine 
regarding the definition of an "appeal" should be accepted as 
being constitutionally required by this Court in all criminal 
cases: 
The standard rule is that appellate 
jurisdiction is the authority to review 
the actions or judgments of an inferior 
tribunal upon the record made in that 
tribunal, and to affirm, modify or reverse 
such action or judgment. 
Peatross v. Board of Comm'rs of Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 
281, 284 (Utah 1976). 
3. This result would of course not have been possible under 
old section 9 because there the constitution itself limited 
new trials as "appeals" to justice court proceedings, which 
did not include felony criminal cases. There is now no such 
constitutional limitation, and the majority opinion offers no 
way of distinguishing so-called appeals at any level. 
